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ABSTRACT 
The main theme of this thesis is to suggest 七hat the MTRC 
model as a non-governmental organization is a desirable set-up to 
carry out government policies of providing the mass transit 
railways. Through the dimension of the administration, management 
and policy making of the MTRC, it will be discovered that the 
corporation can enjoys concurrently,, the flexibility of private 
sector and the institutional backing of government. Therefore, the 
corporation can provide Hong Kong the economically efficient and 
socially effective mass transport system. 
The arguments made in this thesis are based on the classical 
readings in public administration and also economics. In addition, 
the factual data is mainly sourced from year books of the related 
organizations, government publications, newspaper clippings, and 
author's interviews with the MTRC's staff and journalists. However, 
there may be some technical problems unresolved arising from data 
collection. For example, some information is very piece meal and 
remains confidential. Therefore, the paper-writer is required to 
apply more than one information source to support for the accuracy 
of analysis upon a single incident. For example, since the MTRC is 
too sizable an organization, a detail hierarchical order could not 
be provided by the corporation itself. Hence, the study on the 
organizational structure is conducted through the compilation of 
piece-meal data by the author(Chapter 3) . A l s o d u e to the lack of 
the secondary resources in this particular area of the MTR, the 
paper-writer was not able to benefit f r o m o七her authors on 七heir 
different perspectives. Nevertheless, I deeply believe that this 
thesis is one of the few academic works to provide the MTRC a 
relatively comprehensive study from the dimension of public 
administration. 
Patsy, Phaik See MOY 
Department of Government 
and Public Administration 
The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
1993 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In Hong Kong, there are various transport facilities 
available to the public, including franchised buses, subways, 
trains, trams, mini-buses, taxis, and ferries. Of all of 
these, the Mass Transit Railway(MTR) is playing the major role 
in local transportation, and has captured an
:
 average 27% 
market share of public transport in Hong Kong. 
The Hong Kong metro nowadays is a rare subway in the 
world to run on profit. In the year of 1992. the MTRC proudly 
announced its annual profit of $403 million. Besides the 
financial success, the MTR has simultaneously made its 
significant social- contribu七ion as becoming one of the most 
A 
used subways in the world. In the latest record of 1992, the 
MTR captured as many as 2,258,000 average weekday passengers. 
The MTR ridership per route km has even far preceded those of 
its counterparts in London, Seoul, Tokyo and Singapore (for 
details, see Diagrams 1, 2 and 3) . Both the financial and 
social achievements of the MTR are envious. In the author's 
opinion, the corporation has set a good model for an efficient 
and effective administration of other public o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 
. 1 
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS 
D i a g r a m 1 Comparison on route length 
Rot^e Kilometres 
: 5 0 ) i 
450 
w 
400 资 — H c n g K b n g 
25Q. ^ ^ m S L f i n d o n 
^ ^ S ‘ [Sii s^ ms 
I：：；：；：：；： 
3 0 0 S 
2 5 0
 ^ S g Tokyo (TfETA) 
肌 B s 
彻 - . 斗 ” s S ^ H .…: 
Couniries 
2 
Diagram 2 Comparison on average weekday passengers 
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This thesis is a case study of "privatization", w h i c h has 
broadly been taken in the existing literature on the subject 
matter as the transfer of governmental functions from the 
public sector to non-public sector (or "private sector" so to 
speak). Here the MTRC involves the non-governmental and 
corporate management of a mass transport service. This type of 
service, in the conventional concept ion of government, is 
often deemed as a bureau-managed function. In this thesis, 
"privatized" is used as an "adjective" to highlight a cluster 
of characterist ics ranging from non-governmental to quasi-
governmental management of a function which is essential to 
the survival, growth and prosperity of a society. 
U n d e r s t a n d a b l y , "privatized" does not narrowly refer to the 
process of transfer of the government (or publie) ownership to 
the non-governmental (or private) sector. 
In this thesis, several concepts are employed 
interchangeably to highlight the multifaceted identity and 
extremely complex roles and features of the M T R C . In view of 
the non-governmental nature of the MTRC, the organization 
concurrently possesses the elements from both public and 
private spheres. The MTRC reveals not only its private face in 
m a r k e t , but also its "pub 1icness" w h e n carrying out government 
policies. Therefore, the terms "public", "private", and "non-
governmental" become identically appropriate to describe the 
complex identity of the MTRC. In the thesis, the aforesaid 
5 
terms become interchangeably used according to the context in 
discuss ion. 
This thesis attempts to conduct a two dimensional study 
on the MTRC of Hong Kong: both the descriptive and normative 
dimensions. On the descriptive dimension, it will take a 
historical perspective to explore the evolution of the 
corporation and analyze the organizational and managerial 
characteristics of 七 h e MTRC. On 七 h e normative dimension, the 
emphasises will be placed on an assessment of the policy 
package of the MTR including 七 h e administration, management of 
the MTRC, and the policy making' process of the government. In 
the remaining of 七 h i s chapter, the author will first give a 
chronological review of the MTR； and then a preliminary 
discussion of a comparable case, the Singapore MRT • 
• 
Afterwards, an evaluative framework for policy package will be 
- introduced toget-her with the methodoIdgV and scope of study. 
Our descriptive endeavour should be able to establish how 
the MTR was built and organized and how it has been operated 
and managed. This descriptive dimension allows an empirical 
base to make an assessment of the MTRC as a policy package. Of 
course, it requires a basic system of criteria to make a 
policy evaluation upon the case of the MTRC in a consistent 
and comprehensive fashion. In the absence of an analytical 
framework for the policy evaluation in the existing 
6 
literature, our study of the MTRC has to be framed in a broad 
perspective so as to highlight its universality. As 七 h e first 
step, the author will try to make a comparative study of a 
pair of cases (Hong Kong MTRC and Singapore SMRT ) ra七her than 
one case only, in order to derive some general dimensions and 
systematic criteria to measure the performance of similar 
cases of mass transport services which are built, managed and 
operated not by 七 h e conventional bureau, but bv a non-
governmental (privatized) corporation. 
CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW OF THE MTR 
The history of the MTR started in the mid — 196CT when the 
aggravating traffic congestion finally alarmed the Hong Kong 
government. Transport experts were then called in ,七o figure 
out a long-term solution for the problem. In 196 7, after a two 
year study, the final outcome was the suggestion of an 
underground mass carriage. system. The suggested system 
originates from the idea of "SPUN", which is "the study of the 
use of underground space. ” "SPUN" was thought to be 七 h e best 
approach for a high-dense area such as Hong Kong, where 
traffic congestion is mainly the result of overcrowding on the 
ground surface. A similar infrastructure of the ”SPUN" 




There was a long period of follow up research until, in 
1970 the Hong Kong government finally made up its mind to 
build the MTR. The government then con 七 acted four major 
consortia, hoping to arrive at a single—contract arrangement.' 
It was finally decided to grant the project to a Japanese 
consortium in 1974. However, the deal fell apart in January 
1975 due to global problems. The first oil crisis, which 
happened in that year, was expected to cause a world economic 
slump.
3
 Hence, the Japanese revoked their intention. The 
,,,• . ' • "10 . 
construction was also denounced as a million disaster. 
Despite 七 h e skepticism about the risky investment, the 
government had stressed its commitment to the project, and 
started with a truncated version of the initial system so as 
to cut down its financial burden. Also in September 1975, the 
Mass Transit Railway Corporation!MTRC) was founded under the 
11 
MTRC Ordinance Cap.270 • . • —: 
The MTRC is a public, organization solely owned by the 
Hong Kong government. It was set up to undertake the 
construction and the operation of the proposed subway. 
Although it is government owned, the MTRC is designed as a 
non-governmental organization!NGO), which is operated 
independently from the public authority. The MTRC has another 
unique feature: its privatized nature. The corporation is 
statutorily assigned to run on the "prudent commercial 
• • i ” 12 
p n n c lple » 
8 
After the Japanese consortium had withdrawn, taking its 
capital with it, the initial system was altered by the 
Modified Initial System(MIS). However, the problem of 
financing the $5.8 billion for the new project still remained. 
I o • 
The Hong Kong government injected with HKSl.24 billion^" in 
exchange for the shares of the corporation. Besides the 
issuing of bonds and notes, the rest was a pool made up of 
channels of overseas export credit, finance contracts and 
facilities， particularly with Japan, France,, Germany and 
Sweden.
1 4
 The financial arrangements involved various 
international banking and financial institutions. One of the 
principal agreements was facilitated by the Banque National de 
Paris for $1.2 billion. At an average of 10% interest rate, 
* 15 
the MIS debt was expected to be repaid in 12 years. 
Construction work wa§ organized on art international basis 
with a multi-contractual arrangement, comprising 2 5 major 
civil engineering contracts.and 10 electrical and mechanical 
contracts ,
15
 In terms of the monetary value of. contracts, the 
work load was spread in the following manner: Hong Kong 30%， 
Japan 29%, U.K. 25%, Germany 6%, France 5%, Sweden 3% and 
U•S•A 參 參 
Despite the corporation
1
s heavy debt load incurred in 
building the MIS system, the Hong Kong g o v e r n m e n t still 
committed itself to the 'Tsuen Wan and Island Line extensions. 
9 
These lines were opened in 1982 and 1985 respectively. 
However, the construction of the two routes resulted in a 
stream of criticism that the MTRC might not be able to afford 
. • ' n 
its own operating costs, or the repayment of loan interest. 
Despite the constari 七 growth in gross profit earned by the 
MTRC, the long-term financial commitment to its loans, and 七 he 
large interes七 kept the corporation heavily indebted. In 1987, 
the debt reached its peak a七 $1.92 billion.
1 8
 The Hong Kong 
government, as the sole owner, was then committed to a further 
investment of another HK$5,000 million. The capital was paid 
in two lumps, HK$3,500 million in 1981 and HK$1,500 million in 
1985.
1 9
 Whether these financial injections were justified 
still remains a question for public dispute. Moreover, in its 
/ role as financial guarantor for the MTRC, the government 
risked even greater liability. Hence, there are warnings that 
the continuous . borrowing would undermine the financial ... 
'• • a 
credibility of the Hong Kong government.
J 
In spite of the disputes, both the Tsuen Wan(TWE ) and the 
Island Ex七ensions(工SL) could be realized and incorporated into 
the MTR network. The present MTR system is 4 3 . 2 kilometres 
long, has 38 stations and two cross-harbour tunnels. The TWE 
runs from Central directly to Tsuen Wan； and the IL joins 
Shuen Wan with Chai Wan. The Cross Harbour Tunnel was 
completed back in 19 7 2； while the Eastern Harbour Crossing was 
opened in 1989 connecting Lam Tin on Kowloon side with Quarry 
10 
Bay on the Hong Kong Island. 
There had long been a proposal for the construction of 
• „ c\ * 
/ ; 
Eastern. Kowloon and the J u n k — B a y Extensions up 七o 1990/91 
The suggested Eastern Kowloon Route was supposed to run from 
Mariner to Diamond Hill, serving some of the busiest junctions 
such as Mariner, Fat Kwong, To Kwa Wan and Kai Tak airport. 
Another suggestion for the Junk Bay extension arose from the 
government's intention 七o develop the region, However, since 
the government has decided to build the new jChek Lap Kok 
/ 22 
airport, the two initial plans have been abandoned.^ 
This new proposed airport railway package is composed of 
七 w o rail lines： The "Airport Express Line(AEL), and the 
"Lantau L i n e " ( L A L ) . The AEL and LAL joined Tsing Yi from Chek 
Lap Kok and Tung Chung respectively. The purposed project, if 
fully carried out, w o u l d be double the length of the current： 
MTR routes； and its estimated cost for complete construction 
23 
is HK$22 billion at 1991 prices. 
The extension has been designed to be built using'七he 
usual arrangement of multi-contracts. There are 19 civil 
............ 04 
contracts, and 30 electrical and mechanical ones,. If the 
dispute over the new airport's construction can be resolved 
between the Chinese and British government, the MTR contract 
25 
would be tendered in mid-1993. 
11 
Financially, the Hong Kong government is committed to an 
additional injection of $3.7 billion as equi七y shares for the 
corporation. As in usual practice, the government will 
supply the land for 七 h e tracks and stations. Nevertheless,七he 
plan for the airport railway remains uncertain, and relies 
upon the. successful construction of 七 h e Chek Lap Kok airport. 
Even i.f the new airport can be built with China' s approval, 
the railway c o n s t r u c 七 i o n ， due 七o i七s high cost, remains a 
matter* of dispute. ： 
SINGAPORE MASS RAPID TRANSIT 
It is by no means easy to make a systematic and 
comprehensive assessmeri 七 of 七 he MTR by an in-depth 
investigation into one case alone. In order to measure the 
performance of the M'TR, it is n e c e s s a r y to identify some 
analytical dimensions and evaluative criteria not only 
pertinent to the MTR, but also universally relevant to all 
similar cases under similar circumstances. For an explicit and 
systematic comparison, I will make an endeavour to analyze, 
assess and contrast two cases in a pair preliminarily here 
with a purpose to propose an evaluative framework later on. 
Following the establishment of the Hong Kong MTR，another 
little dragon, Singapore also undertook a similar s u b w a y 
»、n 
construction called the Mass Rapid Transit(MRT) in 1 9 8 2 , 
12 




--"-'..”...-..’.,’、,： ... • • •；• • - ;•!.'.••.、一 ：: ••-
••...-/..,.. - O 二 > •.二 •. •• s . • - V.,:
-
. ‘ • ... ： ... ’ ...:•、../. , .... •..• ..... .
 #
 . ‘ • J ； .二- .«___• - - J v • ‘ t- ••• ‘.'.：.• . . _•； ： * .. .. J “ . * “ • 二 一 
Comparatively, the MRT of Singapore is a longer but less 
costly construction. ； The 67 kilometre MRT costs SS5 
billion(HK$18.3 billion).
28
 The currently 43.2 route kilometre 
MTR(Hong Kong) network which comprises the Modified Initial 
Sys七em(MIS)，the Tsuen Wan Extension(TWE) and the Island Line 
(ISL) costs HK$2 6 billion.
23
 The reason for the higher cost 
of Hong Kong' s MTR could be the need for more underground 
drilling of the subway design. The MTR(Hong Kong) focuses 
heavi 
ly on underground construction, and 34.4 kilometres are 
made up of tunnels. In addition, 30 of the 3 8/ stations are 
also underground. In comparison, the MRT construction in 
Singapore is more of a ground development. 48 kilometres of 
the Singaporean subway are built on the ground and overhead, 
with the remaining 19 kilometres made up of tunnels. There is 
a similar picture with stations， only 15 out of the total 
number of 42 stations are underground, as the rest are ground 
constructions.
31
 The MRT network includes an underwater tunnel 
running across the Singapore River, while Hong Kong has 七 w o 
similar infrastructures, the MTR，s Cross—Harbour Tunnel and 
Eastern Harbour Crossing. Simply as a statistical comparison, 
七 h e r e were over 15 ,000 workers'
3
" at the peak of the 
MRT(Singapore) construction. The figure is slightly less than 
33 
13,000 employees of the MTR(Hong Kong). 
A similar arrangement to Hong Kong was adopted by 
Singapore for the construction of the MRT. Building work 
13 
proceeded on a multi-contract base and using international 
teams. Con七rasting 七 h a t the multi—contractual arrangement was 
an ultimate solution for the MTR(Hong Kong), the present 
arrangement of 七 h e MRT(Singapore) is an initial plan of the 
Singaporean government. 
The administrative setting for the MRT is very like the 
Hong Kong metro's. The Mass Rapid Transit C o r p o r a七 i o n ( M R T C ) in 
Singapore is a public organization founded by the parliament 
in 1983 and was incorporated under the Mass' Rapid Transit 
or 
Corpora七ion Act Cap.172. The organizational structures of 
七 h e MTRC and the MRTC are also alike. Because of 七 h e 
government held ownership, the Board members sitting on both 
corporations are required to be government appointments or 
have its approval. ‘ 
However, there is a major difference: the formal 
responsibility of the MRTC、in Singapore is confined to the 
development of the subway. The railway operations in .Singapore 
are tasked to a separate private company, the Singapore MRT 
Limited (SMRT) . The SMRT was founded in 1987 by its majority 
shareholder Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd/
3
 The "private" 
operation of the "public" transport is carried out, using a 
form of licensing system by the government. The SMRT in 
Singapore is granted a ten year renewable licence for running 
the subway. Any issue of joint interest related to the 
14 
MRT(Singapore) operations are based on agreements between the 
SMRT and the MRTC • Even though the MRT operation has been 
"privatized", 七 h e government owned MRTC(Singapore) has 
reserved a veto over the private company by holding of Special 
Rights Preference Share.
3
? Consequently, the SMRT remains 
subject to the government's ultimate control, under the 
operating License coupled with the special share of the 
company. -
There is a crucial difference in classification. Unlike 
Hong Kong, the cons七ruction of the MRT is deemed public 
infrastructure » Therefore, the construction costs are borne by 
the Singaporean government* Despite the shorter rail road of 
the MTR in Hong Kong , the organizational size of the MTRC (Hong 
Kong) is much bigger. The total number of employees hired by 
0 c '.、 
the MTRC(Hong Kong) is over 5 ,000, a considerable contrast 
to only 564 staff
33
 at the MRTC(Singapore) . The Hong Kong MTRC 
is still double the size, taking into account the additional 
40 
2,000 SMRT(Singapore) employees, 
MTR Versus MRT 
Despite the similar operation of the two subways, 
the achievement of the MTR(Hong Kong) looks superior to its 
Singaporean counterpart. Singapore is smaller area with a 
longer rail road operation, compared to the bigger land area 
of Hong Kong running a shorter subway system. As a result of 
15 
its size expected a more completed and better servicing 
transportation network of the Singapore MRT to attract 
ridership. However, it is an opposite finding that the 
MTR(Hong Kong) is enjoying a higher ridership. In 1990， the 
MTR(Hong Kong) and the MRT(Singapore) had the records of 
respectively 2.1 million and 0.6 million average weekday 
passengers (see Diagram 2). Hence, the former even 3.5 七 i m e s . 
the latter. In terms of weekday passengers per route 
kilometre， the MTR(Hong Kong) had a remarkable record of 
48,611 ridership, comparing with 8,955 of the M^T(Singapore) 
(see Diagram 3),
4
* The Singaporean subway annually figures 
42 
gradually grew to 202,280,000 ridership in 1991, which is 
i o • 
a 3 .8% increase. " However,七he figure is not even a third of 
the MTR(Hong Kong) patronage of 725，966,000•
44
 In terms of the 
‘ 4 5 
weekday average of passengers for 1991, the 617,500 " 
MRT(Singapore) passengers remain a 
f ciistanc , 
- ‘ 
massive MTR (Hong Kong) patronage of 2,156,000.’ 
Basically, train fares . are the major income sources of 
the corporations； hence, ridership can determine their 
financial conditions. The MTRC's(Hong Kong) account has 
indicated a budgetary betterment of the corporation. Despite 
the emergency fund offered by the Hong Kong government, the 
<7 . 
MTRC(Hong Kong) is in fact budgetary s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t .
T
 It is 
only the large loan interest, and financial charges which 
undermine the MTRCfHong Kong)，s financial condition. For 
16 
example, in 1990， the MTRC(Hong Kong) earned HK$1,266 
million
4 3
, in addition to an extra profit of HKS204 million 
义G 
in its real estate business." It was only the hefty HK$1,578 
million interest and bank charges which put the corporation at • 
loss of S108 million. In 1991, a profit of HKS67 million 
. go 
appeared on the MTRC，s(Hong Kong) account, while the 
corporation did not receive subsidies from the government. "A 
Returning to Singapore, the MRTC(Singapore) suffered from a 
S$159,473,000 loss in 1989/90. The corporation was still 
subject to a S$200,000 deficit, after receiving a generous 
grant from the government/ The business of the corporation 
was running even worse in 1990/91 , when the deficit was 
S$269,517,000(around HK$1,266.73 million). Again, the 
government was required to subsidise the MRTC's(Singapore) 
account. ‘ 
It is generally assumed that a private subway operator, 
like the SMRT could run "a transport business with more 
commercial successes than a public organization like the MTRG• 
More significantly,七he SMRT is exempted from the building 
expenses of the Singaporean subway, which has provided the 
corporation with a much easier financial environment. Hence， 
the SMRT( Singapore) could run at a profit despite a lower 
ridership than the MTRC in Hong Kong. In 1991， the 
SMRT(Singapore) and MTRC(Hong Kong) have made a profit of 
SS99. 5 million(around HKS467.65 million)
54
 and HK$6 7 million 
17 
respectively. Despite the appaireri七ly better position of the 
former, it is in fact 七 h e indebtedness with construction costs 
which placed the latter in a less favourable position. In 
terms of the total revenue in 1991， the MTRC(Hong Kong) has 
earned HKS3,553 million, which is 3.5 times of the S$220.6 
million(around HKS1036.82 million)
0 0
 generated by the 
SMRT(Singapore). 
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY EVALUATION i 
It may be asked what has made 七 h e MTR successful. The 
indicators of successes include both the economic efficiency 
and the social effectiveness. Here economic efficiency is 
referred to the financial viability of the MTRC, including the 
balance of train fare revenue and operating cost, its package 
of other investment and ventures, and the most importantly, 
the profitability of 七 h e corporation. Social effeetivenessis 
measured by the actual amount of public usage of the 
infrastructure including the MTR ridership and other usages 
for non-riders, the fulfilment of the public satisfaction such 
as the quality of services, and also the achievement of 
government,s goals and public policies by the MTRC. 
As a non-governmental, corporate entity, the MTRC is 
given an institutional role in the context of Hong Kong public 
policy. In the meantime, the corporation has to afford the 
18 
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commercial transport service to the passengers in the 
t e r r i t o r y . U n d o u b t e d l y , commercial functions should occupy a 
very important place in the full range of the MTRC's 
a c t i v i t i e s , but these functions should be appreciated from a 
policy perspective which is broader than commercial concern. 
- H e n c e , speaking of the MTRC's "performance", its commercial 
success is ohe among many criteria in a framework of policy 
e v a l u a t i o n . As a tool of the government's policy the MTRC's 
performance should be evaluated in a consistent and systematic 
fashion. A c c o r d i n g l y , this paper proposes an multi-dimensional 
evaluative framework to measure the MTRC's performance• 
Among many possibly relevant dimensions of m e a s u r e m e n t s , 
this thesis suggests to consider three evaluative dimensions: 
market principles, organizational principles and public 
functions (see Diagram 4) . Market principles have to be 
incorporated because the mass transport services has become 
commercialized in the MTRC. T h u s , whether the MTRC is 
profitable and commercially viable is a question posed by its 
owner and designer, the Hong K o n g government. The government 
upon its creation, understandably, makes the MTRC commercially 
successful not. solely for the sake of profit-making. Beyond 
commercial objectives, the MTRC has, by d e s i g n , to fulfil 
public policy purposes: including the public transport policy 
as well as other broader policy o b j e c t i v e s . The MTRC has been 
successful in meeting not only the commercial principles but 
19 
D i a g r a m 4 Indicators of su c c e s s e s 
I. F U L F I L M E N T OF MARKET P R I N C I P L E S : : : 
1.1. Financial achievement 
I . 1 . i . self-supportive/ subsidized 
. I . l . i i . p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
工 / l . i i i . c r e d i b i l i t y in financial m a r k e t 
1 . 2 . M a r k e t a b i l i t y 
I . 2 . i . subway ridership 
I.2.ii. varieties of business operation 
1 . 3 . M a r k e t fairness 
1.4. Competitiveness in market 
工 工 , O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L P R INCIPLES 
.、 1 1 . 1 . L e g a l flexibility 
11.2. Instrumental flexibility 
Flexibility of structural design 
Proper adjustment of organizational 
design according to changing 
e n v i r o n m e n t ! 
11.3. Management and administration ； 
工 工 F l e x i b i l i t y in manipulation of 
decision- making and policy analysis 
models 
II. 3'. ii , R a t i o n a l i t y in dec i s i o n - m a k i n g 
II.3.iii. Insulation from undesired influence 
II，3.iv. Centralization of decision-making 
power 
II.3.V. Allowance of pluralist input 
I I . 3 . v i . C o n t i n u i t y and consistency of p o l i c y 
package 
• . 
III. FULFILMENT OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS : : y / 
III.1. Sufficiency of public usage 
I l l . l . i . Subway r i d e r s h i p 
I l l . l . i i . Usage of o t h e r facilities of the 
infras t r u c t u r e 
III.2* Fulfilment of g o v e r n m e n t policies 
I I I . 2 . i . T r a n s p o r t p o l i c i e s 
III.2.ii. U r b a n p l a n n i n g 
III.2.iii.0thers 
I I I . 3 . Political c o n s e q u e n c e s 
III.3.i. Client politics 
I I I . 3 . i i . Entrepreneurial politics 
I I I . 3 . i i i . I n t e r e s t - g r o u p politics 
III.3.iv. M a j o r i t a r i a n politics ( in t h e o r y , it 
is the m o s t desirable m o d e l in terms 
of both the efficiency and equality 
of public goods and services 
distribution) 
20 
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also other objectives of the urban development and the 
economic prosperity of Hong Kong. 
.城. |j 
T o support the above f i n d i n g s , it has to sub s t a n t i a t e 
that the MT R C is capable of sa t i s f y i n g the commercial 
e n v i r o n m e n t in H o n g K o n g ' s context and con c u r r e n t l y carrying 
out its public d u t i e s of pr o v i d i n g the mass transport system 
of subway s e r v i c e s . To m e a s u r e the MTRC's p e r f o r m a n c e . 
C r i t e r i a I and III in Diagram 4 (they are r e s p e c t i v e l y the 
fulfilment of market principles and the fiilf i lment of pu b l i c 
f u n c t i o n s ) are to evaluate the M T R C ' s capability of sa t i s f y i n g 
-
the commercial environment and its p u b l i c d u t i e s . In regard to 
C r i t e r i o n II of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s , they are 
important as they d i r e c t l y affect the MTRC's p e r f o r m a n c e on 
C r i t e r i a I and III. The in d i c a t o r s of 'organizational 
p r i n c i p l e s g e n e r a l l y include legal f l e x i b i l i t y , instrumental 
flexibility， and management and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
It is p r o p o s e d in this thesis that the MTRC has 
succ e s s f u l l y f u l f i l l e d the H o n g K o n g G o v e r n m e n t ' s public 
o b j e c t i v e s , n a m e l y , providing the ec o n o m i c a l l y efficient and 
socially effective mass transit services in the high-dense 
area of Hong K o n g . In other w o r d s , the MT R C is in full 
compatibility w i t h the market e c o n o m y of Hong K o n g , coupled 
w i t h the flexibility to adapt to the p o l i t i c a l , institutional 
21 
and policy environment in Hong Kong. With special regard to 
the scenario of compatibility and flexibili七y, i七 is referred 
to the insulation from the unwanted political interference, 
its ability to have access to the financial and investment 
sources, and also its achievement of the economic efficiency 




To conduct a comprehensive study upon the MTRC， as 
mentioned,七 he author will apply a policy-analysis and a 
comparative approach through an evaluative framework. To 
analyze policies,七here are many different dimensions. David 
H. Rosenbloom, an important scholar in public .administration, 
has conducted an extensive study upon the managemeri七，politics 
• and law in public sectors. In Chapter 2 of Organization : 
Theory: A Public Perspective, Gortner and other writers also 
devote a complete section to the comparison of public 
organizations with private sectors from the legal, economic 
and political aspects. Henry Mintzberg' studies public 
administration from the institutional and structural 
dimension. In Mintzberg's Structure in Fives:_Designing 
Effective Organizations, Weberian model of bureaucracy is 
further elaborated. Upon the managerial and administrative 
level of policy package, Charles Lindblom concentrates on 
22 
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decision-making models, H.V. Savi七ch focuses upon the 
identities of decision makers and policy participants. In the 
light of political approach, James Q. Wilson concentrates on 
the issue of cost and i n t e r e s t distribution. To shed light on 
the academic contributions of the above writers, the author 
wil'l apply the said different dimensions to study the MTRC. In 
addition, there will be two dimensions of comparison in this 
thesis. The first dimension is a general comparison of the 
non-governmental MTRC with public bureaus 丨 and private 
business. On the secondary dimension, it is a cross-country 
comparison of subway operation (i.e. with Singapore) in order 
to evaluate the performance of Hong Kong MTRC from a 
comparative perspective. 
Why is Singapore chosen for comparison? The similarities 
of Singapore and Hong Kong have raised the interest of many 
writers. Doing similar economic miracles, both city-states are 
transformed from the British、 en七repots to the nowadays' mini-
dragons of Asia. Despi七e the identical economic achievements, 
the policy packages of the 七 w o areas are always dissimilar- it 
is the laissez-faire principle of the Hong Kong government 
comparing to the more government planned system in Singapore. 
Although the MRT in Singapore is modelled after Hong Kong MTR, 
the policy packages on the two subways also differ. It may be 
wondered whieh subway package can suit Hong Kong better. . 
Therefore, it becomes worthwhile to compare the different 
23 ‘ 
•.•..•••..••.,'..•....•... 、 ' ， . ： : • ； . ， “ 1 ' . , • •  ：‘ •.. • :. /；./ . ：••‘ ： - . ‘ ‘ “‘ - ' ‘ ‘‘: •-‘：^. / ‘ \ ‘ •：. ‘. ‘ ： .. 二 • ：二 : .,.•/ , 
..^；^. * ..••、•,»' •、...-•• . ‘' ‘ \ ‘“ • • •, / . • ‘ . •• .* .••••、 ‘ ‘ ‘ • •- ‘； . . • . i ,. 二 ^ . . . :、::..：,..；•• . ：•‘ . . . ’ ‘ ： 'A ，•-'/,' .• _ / .
 -
 • .•. ..it. 、.一•’ 
policy packages which result in their dissimilar policy 
results. More importantly, through the new dimension of a 
cross-country comparison, the author can better examine the 
adaptability of the MTR to the Hong Kong's context. 
厂 The data sources in 七his thesis are mainly collected from 
year books, government publication, news report and personal 
interviews. They supply the information possibly found. To 
ensure the accuracy of the study, the author, whenever 
necessary and possible, will make use of different information 
sources to support for any single statement in the thesis. 
AREA AND SCOPE OF STUDY 二 —：一一— —_二： -二：: 
In light of the "successes" of the MTRC, our study will 
focus on the administration, management and policy making in 
the MTR and the MTRC. Before proceeding with this study, it is 
important to understand the nature of the organization so as 
to distinguish the MTRC from other public bureaus. What 
differences are there? Do 七he differences enhance its 
compatibility with the market system of Hong Kong? To answer 
the questions, the thesis will identify the distinctive nature 
of the MTRC as a non-governmental organization (Chapter 2). 
Besides its non-governmental nature, the MTRC differs 
from public bureaus in many aspects. One of them is its 
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organizational structure. History has told us that the MTRC 
has passed through a series of structural transformation. From 
the structural dimension, as Weber suggested, we can project 
to the administration and management of the corporation. 
Therefore, this thesis will also study the organizational 
configuration of the MTRC (Chapter 3). 
To begin 七he study of policy-making, it may be useful to 
explore the government/s goal-mix. What are the goals that the 
government strives to achieve in the MTR? Based on such goal-
mix, we will trace back the government * s maneuvering of 
d e c i s i o n a l - s t r a t e g i e s in the MTR (Chapter 4) . Taking a 
different dimension to study policy-making, I will also 
analyze the mode of policy participation in the MTR (Chapter 
5). … 
Besides the "desirable" set-up of the MTRC, there could 
be other factors contributing to the "successes" of the Hong 
Kong subway. Sometimes through comparison with others, we can 
mirror ourselves better. Hence, it is worth elaborating 
further on a comparative study with the MRT in Singapore 
(Chapter 6). Finally, the conclusive chapter (Chapter 7) will 
summarize our findings in relation to the MTRC. In addition, 
for the purpose of evaluation, the findings derived from each 
chapter will be framed in Diagram 4 of "Indicators of 
successes" as appendices at the end of this thesis. In sum, it 
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is proposed in this thesis that， measured in terms of anv 
possible indicators, the MTRC,s success is attributed to the 
hybrid combination of its organizational design. This design 
allows the corporation to enjoy the advantages of both the 
flexibility of private commercial business and the 
institutional backing of a governmental unit. More 
meaningfully, from 七 h e MTRC's history, I would like to remark 
the distinctive nature and characteristics of the 
organization, so as to confer its experience on other NGOs. 
• 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE MTRC 
AS A NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 
The uniqueness of the MTRC originates from its special 
identity as a non-governmental organization(NGO), which lies 
in the grey region between public and private spheres. On the 
one hand,七 he MTRC was created by the Hong Kong; government as 
a public organization, I 七 is subject to the guidelines 
stipulated in 七 h e MTRC Ordinance for exercising its "public" 
function in society. On 七 h e other hand, the corporation is 
obliged to run as a private commercial undertaking to make a 
profit. This shows 七he "private" face of 七he organization in 
the market • This chapter tries to sugge&七 that 七he hybrid set-
up of the MTRC which combines the merits from both public and 
private spheres would be desirable for carrying out government 
policies. Firs七 of all, how different is 七 h e MTRC to a public 
bureau? Then, how is 七 h e former superior to the latter? More 
importantly, is the MTRC compatible will the laissez-faire 
capitalism in Hong Kong,s.context? 
The MTRC was created in a similar manner as a standard 
public bureau, through a political process in 七 h e Executive 
and Legislative Councils•丄 Here 七h沄 author refers a standard 
public bureau as a general government office, which is created 
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by 七 he government and is under its ownership. The general 
functions of these bureaus are to implement government 
policies and to deliver public goods and services. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the MTRC is distinctive from other 
public bureaus in its economic, legal and political aspects. 
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SECTOR TN FREE MARKET : 
According to 七 h e laissez faire policy of the Hong Kong' 
government, the public authority should minimize its 
interference with the market. As a general belief, "government 
bureaus are not linked to markets in the way that private 
firms and individuals are" ,and the involvement of the public 





 In view of the MTRC operation, the 
. public organization is statutorily obliged to run on the basis 
• q 
of the "prudent commercial principle". The participation of 
the MTRC in the marke七 becomes as direct and significant as 
private sec七op. Apparently, the MTRC has violated 七 h e 
prescribed tenets of a public bureau. 
Nevertheless, even the zealots of laissez faire have left 
room for government participation. In addition to the "third 
duty of social function" suggested by Adam Smith, a more 
radical economist Milton Friedman has also admitted the 
necessity of government in society. In his book Capitalism and 
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Freedom, Friedman states that ”七 he role of government just 
considered is to do something that the market cannot do for 
itself, n a m e l y , to de七ermine， arbitrate， and enforce the rules 
of the game. In the present case of the MTR，七he subway 
construction is the largest and most expensive infrastructure 
in "Hong Kong history The financial burden and 七 he risk 
involved have created barrier to the entry of private 
companies in the very first place. Therefore, only the public 
sector had 七 h e capacity to undertake the $26 billion venture.
3 
Accordingly,七he role of the "public" MTRC became inevitable 
and also should be justified in free market. 
In consideration of resource allocation, a bureau is 
normally entitled to the public funds appropriated by 
J 
government. Such appropriation is politically determined. 
Hence, b u d g e t is no七 much ojf a-bureau's concern, as long as 
the expenses are wi.thin limit. As a result, there are frequent 
criticisms about the economic inefficiency of 七 h e public 
sector. Similar criticism has also been made by Milton 
Friedman: 
The bureaucrats spend someone else * s money on 
someone else. Only human kindness, not the much 
stronger and more dependable spur of self-interest, 
assures that they will spend the m o n e y in the way 
most beneficial to the recipients. Hence 七 q e 
wastefulness and ineffectiveness of the spending. 
Unlike a public bureau, the MTRC is operated under a 
completely different financial environment. The corporation 
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has 七o undertake the subway construction costs and its 
operating expenses. . Direct financial assistance of the 
government is limited to the offering of land and the 
emergency fund. Moreover,七he transfer of public funds is made 
in 七 h e form of debt/ Instead of simply receiving grants and 
subsidies from 七 h e public authority, the MTRC is obliged to 
pay off all the debts owed to the government and its other 
debtors. Therefore, the survival of 七 h e MTRC is significantly 
dependent upon its own financial achievement, rather than a 
political decision. Consequently, the concern'of economists 
about the wasteful and ineffective spending of bureaucrats is 
irrelevant here. 
The complex environment of the MTRC 
According to Anthony Downs(1967), a public bureau who is 
subject to the political environment does not encounter the 
external market.
1 0
 On the other hand, a private business 
simply concentrates on 七 h e market environment. Nevertheless, 
both sectors are free from worries in either way. The MTRC 
undertakes a hard task of facing a complex environment.
1 1
 The 
NGO is subject to different but identically important elements 
in the both public and private spheres . These elements include 
the governmen七（its owner),七he public and more importantly, 
the market a 七 large. Due to this exposure to a more open 
system,
12
 the MTRC is obliged to fulfil wider interests. 
Therefore, from time to time the corporation has to balance 
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one interest with others and act spontaneously. 
A government bureau usually supplies socially oriented 
goods and services
1 3
 "under non-market conditions."
1 4
 In 
terms of the MTR price setting, the t r a i n services have been 
commercialized for market purposes； and the MTRC has the 
15 • , 
financial autonomy of train fare adjustment. Therefore, the 
"public" transport of the MTR can no longer be seen in the 
nature of p u b l i c / s e m i — p u b l i c services.
1 5
 Besides 七 rain 
operation, the MTRC also supplies other commercial goods, such 
as private properties under its joint-ventures with private 
developers.
1 7
 Consequently, the market orientation of the MTRC 




: Looking further at the output dimensioni the non-market 
production of a public bureau has contributed to a special 
standard of measurement upon its performance. Such measurement 
is subject to an external and political evaluation, which 
could be subjective and vague. In the present case of the 
MTRC, the general market evaluation of profitability is 
adopted by 七he organization. Due to the commercial nature of 
the MTRC output, its performance is subject to the market 
mechanism and could be more objectively evaluated as from its 
budgetary achievement. In my belief, the market signal 
provides a more stable and comprehensive index than a 
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political evalua七ion of the organization. In 七 his way, the 
MTRC can easily adapt to public needs. Smith and classical 
liberals also believe 七 ha 七 " t h e market would lead to a 
constant striving to improve the quality of products and to 
organize production in the most efficient and least costly 
- I g 
manner possible." 
Following the market signal, the MTRC can also improve its 
operative management in a more efficient manner. 
Legal and political status of the MTRC 
Statutorily, it has been declared in the MTRC Ordinance 
2 0 
that the MTRC is NOT a Crown servari七 or agent. Hence, the • 
official and legal identity of the MTRC has been distinguished 
, from that of a public bureau. 
/ 
.. In the daily operation of a standard public bureau, both 
its functions and structures would be stipulated in law, so 
21 
that its management is fettered by a legal framework. As a 
consequence, the bureaucratic system is always criticized for 
its rigid procedures, rules and regulations. Moreover, Robert 
K. Merton has protested that "these rules [referring to those 
regulate the bureaucratic system] in time become symbolic m 
22 
cast, rather than strictly utilitarian. “ 
Compared to public bureaus, more flexibility is enjoyed 
by the MTRC. The corporation is empowered with autonomy in 
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many areas by the MTRC Ordinance. This autonomy covers both 
internal and external decisions. The internal administrative 
decisions include the personnel procedures, the variations of 
organizational structure and business forms, and the 
transference of property.
2 3
 Externally, the important autonomy 
i n c l u d e s 七 h e . right of the MTRC to enter into and withdraw from 
c o n t r a c 七 s . 2 4 The corporation can decide to operate behind 
closed-doors like any normal private business. More 
importantly， the corpora七ion is immune from the bothersome 
legal procedures suffered by public bureaus. There will be 
more detailed discussions on 七 h e MTRC s t r u c t u r a l flexibility 
in Chapter 3. 
The administration of public law is one of 七 h e central 
functions of a government bureau.
2 5
 The MTRC also Undertakes 
to implement certain laws , including the MTRC (Land Resumption 
and Related Provisions ) Ordinance, and other regulations and 
by-laws.
2 7
 However, the major function of the MTRC is to 
operate as a commercial business. Hence, its administration of 
the public law is not its core role but o n l y peripheral to its 
construction and operation of the MTR. 
Like a public bureau, the creation of the MTRC followed 
a series of political procedures. For example, the approval of 
the Executive and Legislative Councils, and the Governor. More 
meaningfully, the MTRC is both founded and owned by the Hong 
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Kong government, making it indivisible from the public 
authority. 
As mentioned， the survival of the MTRC is more 
economically than politically determined. In the process of 
profit-making, the corporation is also concurrently playing an 
instrumental role for the government in implementing other 
public policies. The major ones include transport policy and 
urban planning. This obligation is statutorily ； s t i p u l a t e d in 
the MTRC Ordinance.
2 8
 Also, despite the MTRC autonomy over its 
administrative and financial issues, the decisions related to 
public policies are completely controlled by the Hong Kong 
government. Hence, the MTRC, as a public organization, remains 
strong in terms of its political role and public obligations. 
PRIVATE FACE OF THE MTRC 
In distinguishing the MTUC from a public bureau, some of 
its "private" features have been revealed. The private nature 
of the non-governmental body is mostly derived from its profit 
orientation. Hence, the MTRC's involvement in the market is as 
direct as any standard private business. With the a s s i s t a n c e 
of the Hong Kong government, however, the corporation could 
gain the upper hand in "Not-Very-Fair" competition with other 
public transports. Its superiority in financial, legal and 
political contexts concurrently highlights its distinctions 
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from a general private corporation in the following ways. 
In spite of 七 h e direct participation of the MTRC in the 
free market, f a i r competition is not necessarily guaranteed. 
According to the "inter—model coordination"" of the 
government's transport policy, the MTR and the other 
government owned Kowloon-Canton Railway(KCR) are designed to 
provide the major source of tr a n s p o r t in H o n g ' K o n g . H e n c e , 
other forms are running only in a complementary capacity to 
the two railway systems. Under "coordination", sequential 
government arrangements are made in favour of the two public 
corporations. There are frequent accusations that official 
protection is to shelter the rail business from direct market 
competition. Compared to the MTRC and the K o w l o o n - C a n t o n 
Railway C o r p o r a t i o n ( K C R C ) , the market opportunities in other 
forms of transpoi?七 are exploited.
3 0 
In defence of the "inter—model coordination",七he MTRC is 
one of the government's strategies to resolve the "social" 
problem of the traffic nightmare. Therefore, such an 
intervention is simply the need to perform the task which 七 h e 
market will not, and cannot manage by itself• Accordingly,七he 
reluctant viola七ion of free market competition by inter-model 
coordination can be justified even in the economic sense of 
both Smith and Milton. , 
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The market nature of the MTRC has been discussed. More of 
七 h e commercial characteristics can be seen in the MTRC，s legal 
capacity to borrow and issue stocks.
 1
 Even though the 
government has declared its immunity from the fiscal 
responsibility to the corporation,七he financial credibility 
of 七 h e MTRC is mainly derived from the guarantee by 七 h e Hong 
Kong government.
3
' The royal guarantee was particularly 
important at the infant stage of the corporation whose 
reputation was not yet established. Although the guarantee is 
no七 a direct financial measure, the offering of such 
assistance by the Hong Kong government is equally as 
support ive• 
In 七 h e private sector, the special treatment may seem too 
biased in favour of the MTRC. On the other hand, the author 
regards both 七 h e government's financial guarantee and the 
public organization set-up of the MTRC as justified. In view 
of the considerable investment in the MTR, it is inevitable 
that there must be a financial appeal to overseas market. In 
the form of public organization, the MTRC could more e a s i l y 
resort to f o r e i g n countries for funding. In mos七 cases, the 
financial deal requires 七 h e official guarantee of government. 
For example, the export credits totalling $1.24 billion in the 
MIS were procured by the intergovernmental agreements between 
f A 
Hong Kong and other countries.^ Since the borrowing 
requirement is beyond the capacity of the private sec七or, 
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government intervention in the MTR becomes inescapable. Also, 
only with some degree of government ownership, can the public 
authority be justified in offering its financial guarantee to 
the corporation. 
‘Withou七 a doubt, the government guarantee" provided the 
MTRC with a good start. Nonetheless, the MTRC could not have 
enjoyed further successes without its own dedication. The MTRC 
gained very high credit ra七ings of an A, an A3/Aa2 and an AA 
grading respectively from Standard & Poor，s, Moody，s and The 
Japan Bond Research Institute in. the year of 1991.
v
 Credit 
ratings are important as 七 hey can reflect 七 he financial 
credibility of a company, which will determine its capability 
to borrow in the financial market. 
_ Under a free market economy，七he operation of a private 
business should be subject to the minimal legislative 
interference.
3 5
 Where the public interest is concerned, 
legislation can be imposed to regulate the private sphere./ 
The MTRC Ordinance is more to provide the corporation with a 
guidance than to impose regulatory confinement. The regulatory 
function seems to focus m o s t l y on railway safety•“Another 
f u n c t i o n . o f t h e Ordinance i s t o empower t h e c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h 
special legal rights and privileges. This power includes land 
resumption, MTRC，s by-law and regulations, and s t a m p - d u t y 
exemptions. The Ordinance goes so far as to even discharge the 
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corporation from other public law liabilities. For example, 
• the MTRC is exempted from certain provisions of the Public 
Health and Urban Services Ordinance, and Summary Offenses in 
relation to public nuisance.
3 S
 This means 七 h e MTRC Ordinance 
can be used as an exclusive legal weapon for the corpora七ion 
to override other laws and to limit civil claims against it. 
In enacting the Ordinance, the MTRC is as—authoritative 
and coercive as any public bureaus. This 丨 a u t h o r i t y is 
particulairly useful in the MTRC ' s acquisition of private lands 
during construction. The lands are claimed regardless of the 
reluctance of tenants and landowners However, the 
regulatory function of public law does not seem important to 
the MTRC. In stead, the MTRC Ordinance is designed more 七6 
strengthen the legal power of 七 h e corporation. , 
On the issue of the legal pow^r of public a u t h o r i t y ' s , 
there are polar standings taken by different schools of 
economics. In strong o p p o s i七 i o n to. government intervention， 
the classical writer Milton Friedman has criticized: 
It [referring to government] is also the agency 
that is widely regarded as having a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force or the threat of force as 
the means through which some of us can legitimately 
impose restraints through force upon others of 
u s e . " 
On the other hand, the students of a Democratic 
Society(SDS) 
back in the early 1960s upheld the authority of government by 
pinpointing that "the aversion to authority had resulted in an 
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organization [ 七 h i s could also imply our society] so loosely 
and ineffectively structured that it was hardly capable of any 
we11-coordinated mass action at a丄丄. 
To weigh between the risk of government abuse of its 
legal power and the effectiveness of goal achievement is the 
most difficult task. Nevertheless, Friedman himself regarded 
government as: “ . 
a form of volxmtary cooperation， a way in which 
people choose to achieve some of their objectives 
through governmental entities because they believe 
that ^ s the most effective means of achieving 
them.‘ 
Accordingly, the judgement must be about the public 
accountability of government. Unless the Hong Kong government 
is perceived as not to be trusted by 七 h e public, the legal 
power of the MTRC should be upheld. 
DECISION MAKING OF THE MTRC • 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the administration arid 
management of the MTRC has been internally and independently 
decided along private sector lines. Nevertheless, the "big" 
issues are politically and externally decided by 七 h e Hong Kong 
15 
government, such as the route design of the railways. ‘ Thus, 
the role of government in MTRC decision-making remains 
important and is far significant than in private organization. 
43 
The board of a corporation is the 七 o p - d e c i s i o n making 
unit in the organization. In the MTRC, the Board members are 
subject to the appointment and approval by the Governor. 
Hence, it is usually 七 h e province of political elites, and 




 For example, the S e c r e t a r y for Transport 
and S e c r e t a r y for Urban Planning are ex-officio members of the 
Boarrd.
4
" Although the actual functions of the MTRC Board are 
minimal, the appointments of public officials to it may 
symbolize 七 h e government's supervision and representation in 
七 h e organization. The composition of the Board has highlighted 
the "public" aspect of the MTRC. • / 
Basicallyj a private business will concentrate on self-
iriterest;. hence, the concern for its accountability to 
governmen七 is not stressed. Being a public institution running 
like a private business, the MTRC is held accountable 七o its 
creditors, and also simultaneously to the Hong Kong government . 
and the public at large • 
Politically, it is not unusual for private companies to 
be subject to government
f
 s directions, such as through 
legislation. However, direct commands from government towards 
the priva七e sector are always criticized as an encroachment 
upon 七 h e market. Hence, the author regards 七 h e creation of 
public organizations as a more effective mechanism to 
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implement public policies. With government ownership, the 
public authority can exert more direct and authoritative power 
on the MTRC. Moreover, the organization is statutorily obliged 
to implement government's decisions/'" The public organization 
may -in turn achieve a better cooperation with government, than 
its private counterpar•七s. This is of benefit where, for 
example, "big" issues such as 七 he extensions of subway 
networks and property developments are required with 
coordination of the government's , u r b a n and city planning' 
departments, 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter, on the one hand, has tried to demons七rate 
that goverriment inte]?veri 七 ion, as in the MTRC, is due to the 
incapability of the market 七o supply the service. On the other 
hand, the author ^  cannot deny that certain unwari七ed 
externalities, such as 七 h e violation of free competition have 
resulted from government intervention. Nevertheless, the non-
governmental and commercialized MTRC appears to dilute the 
"publicness" of the subway service . More importantly, the 
privatized form of the MTRC can effectively avoid the 
shortcomings of government public bureaus. (For more details 
of the comparison, please refer to Appendix I). 
4 5 
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We have just discussed the semi-public and semi-private 
nature of 七 h e MTRG• However； can this hybrid creature be 
justified in the capitalist system. of Hong Kong? First of 
all, I would argue that 七 h e MTR exists as a form of semi — 
ca
P
i七alist system. A semi-capitalist system originates from 
capi talism» 
Bv a general definition, capitalism is: 
at its most simple .and value-free it refers to any 
economic system where 七 h e r e is a combination of 
private property, a relatively free and competitive 
market, and a general assumption that the bulk of 
the workforce will be engaged in employment by 
private^nor^governmeriiLal) employers engaged in 
producing what and economic theory, like all 
politico-economic systems. 
Obviously, a semi-capitalist system posses some part of these 
market characteristics. 
The MTRC is protected from complete capitalism for two 
/ 
reasons. Firstly, the role of governmen七 in the MTRC is too 
strong and has violated the principle of "fairness" in a free 
market. Secondly, the ownership of the MTRC is not private in 
nature. Nevertheless, other capitalist features remains. First 
of all, other modes of public tpanspor*七 still operate in the 





 nature of the MTRC has .justified its existence 
in capitalism. This non-government nature has left room for 
"profitabili七y"， the MTRC，s commercial principle clearly 
demonstrates this vital element of capitalism. As mentioned, 
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the "public" undertaking of the MTR is due to the market 
failure to provide 七 he necessary services. Therefore, 
governmen七 in七erven七ion has been justified in 七 h e form of a 
n o n - g o v e r n m e n t MTRC. In 七 e r m s of image， the semi—capi七alis七 
system reflected by 七 h e MTRC seems to neutralize any sense of 
"publicness" in the railway. Returning 七o the initial 
question： is the MTRC compatible with the laissez-faire 
capitalism of Hong Kong? Without" a doubt， the answer is 
affirmat ive. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MTRC 
In Chapter、， the n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l nature of the MTRC has 
been contrasted with 七 hat of a public bureau. As a major 
difference, the MTRC exists in a changeable commercial 
environment . Therefore , bureaucratic rigidity may no七 suit 七 h e 
organization. For a better adaptability to the market, the 
MTRC is allowed with flexibility. The design of its 
organizational structure is an important area of autonomy 
enjoyed by the corporal:ion•
1
 With this flexibility, the MTRC-
can from time to time restructure its organizational form, in 
order to keep pace with growth. 
To study a public organization such as the MTRC, one may 
take a number of theoretical.perspeetives iri七o considerations. 
Firs七 of all, close analysis of Weberian r a t i o n a l - b u r e a u c r a t i c 
idea type can be introduced in order to highlight 七 he 
functions of the formal dimension of the MTRC• The German 
sociologist Max Weber could be the herald of organizational 
studies on public organizations, including government 
institutions. As he put it， his model as "the most rational 
and effective form of organization yet devised by man•” Weber 
considers the application of rules and regulations is the key 
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to effectiveness of bureaucracy. However, considerable 
reservation on Weberian ideal type was put forth by scholars 
on organization. In order to underscore the discrepancy 
between the formal and informal dimensions, which is resulted 
from environmental changes, Robert Merton put it: 
Actions based upon training and skills which have 
been successfully applied in the post may result in 
inappropriate responses under changed conditions. 
An inadequate flexibility in the application of 
, s k i l l s , will, in a changing milieu, result in more 
or less serious maladjustments.“ 
One would find, furthermore, that Weberian.ideal type is 
even less related to the study of 七 h e MTRC's organizational 
structure when one focuses on very dynamic aspects of its 
evolution from the construction stage to the stage of its full 
operation. Nevertheless , its basic features are relevant, and 
their saliency and weight might vary from one evolutionary 
stage to another. To illustrate this variation in the 
evolu七ionary process, a brief account of Henry Mintzberg，s 
conceptualizations of five key organizational components 
should be very helpful . . 
According to Mintzberg, an organization is basically 
composed of five major units; that is the operating core, 
strategic apex, middle line, technostructure and support 
staff / The operating core is located at the lowest 
hierarchical level. Its function is to perform basic work 
which is directly related to 七 h e production and d e l i v e r y of 
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goods and services. The strategic apex which is located at 七 h e 
. o t h e r end of an organizational hierarchy is formally the 
highest authority, I七 tiakes on responsibility for the whole 
organization with its major task to formulate the 
organization's strategies . The middle line suits in the middle 
of a sandwich, bridging the operating core and 七 h e strategic 
core. Its major functions include the transmission of commands 
from 七 o p managers to the basic staff below, as well as 七 h e 
collection of feedback in a reverse direction. The 
technos七ructure is beyond the boundaries of the organizational 
hierarchy. Nevertheless, the unit has a significant effect on 
the performance of the core, such as to improve the efficiency 
of its opera七ion. Finally, 七 h e support staff play a 
"supplementary" role in the organization, but exist outside 
its operation. 
To identify the roles of various divisions of a 
corporation, such as 七he MTRC.，. it— is—vital 七o understand its 
business nature. According to the MTRC Ordinance,七he 
organization is statutorily required to construct and to 
operate the Mass Transit Railway.
0
 The corporation is also 
p e r i p h e r a l l y encouraged to participate i n real estate 
development, as the MTRC is permitted to construct buildings 
particularly above subway depots.
5
 The corporation revenue is 
drawn from different sources: train fares, property 
development and others ill relation to rentals.
 1
 Altholig'h the 
5 5 
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size of the property division, at 321 staff, is not big, the 
accumulative profits generated by property development had 
reached HK$3,980 million by 1990 .
8
 Nevertheless, train fares 
remain the major revenue source, which contribute one half of 
0 ‘ 
the corporation's total annual income/ Also, the operation 
division, with 3 ,852 out of the total 5,103 employees is the 
if) . 
largest department within the corporation.
1
" Thus, in terms 
of both the income sources and the employment distribution of 
the MTRC, its .principal business activities include 七 h e 
official duties of subway construction and operation, as well 
as real estate development. j 
In light of the MTRC’s business nature, the operating 
core of the corporation can be seen to include construction 
workers, operating staff, together with property managing 
staff. At the other end of the organizational hierarchy, the 
Board of Directors is 七 h e highest d e c i s i o n — m a k i n g v body• The 
daily operation of the MTRC is handed over to a functional 
1 1 * 
group of E x e c u t i v e Directorates 广丄 The Executive Directorates 
take the role of strategic apex. The m a j o r 七 e c h n o s t r u c t u r e is 
the engineering department which is in charge of 七 h e safety 
and smooth operation of the MTRC. Having identified the 
operative parts, what kind of organizational model does the 
MTRC belong to? To answer the question, let us turn to the 
next section. ； 
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MTPr ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL 
Bureaucracy mostly found in a large scale and mature 
organization such as a governmental i n s t i t u t i o n . Because the 
MTRC began with sizable employment for its construction and 
operation, I would refer the MTRC to a bureaucratic model 
suggested by W e b e r . ^ N e v e r t h e l e s s , new bureaucratic models ^ 
h a v e
 been proposed as to supplement the inadequacy of Weber's 
m o
d e l as applied to the real w o r l d , such as the machine and | 
professional bureaucracies created by Mintzberg. ； | 
The basic c h a r a c t e r s of a Weber's bureaucracy include ( i ) 丨 
division of labour ( i i ) w e 1 1 - d e f i n e d authority hierarchy (iii) J 
high formalization (iv) impersonal nature (v) employment 
decisions b a s e d on merit (vi ) career tracks for employees, and 
finally (vii) distinct separation of members' organizational 
13 
and personal lives. 
• 
M i n t z b e r g ' s model of "machine bureaucracy" is a close but 
simpler version of Weber's bureaucracy, but the former skips 
t h
e elaboration on career prospect and depersonalized 
management. Instead, the machine bureaucracy stresses the 
functional division of technostructxire as the key part of an 
organizat ion, 
in Mintzberg's mode 1, "professional bureaucracy" is an 
addition to Weber's formulations. This model highlights the 
5 7 
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o c c u p a t i o n of " p r o f e s s i o n a l s " as the operating core of an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . The " p r o f e s s i o n a l s " here are referred to the 
s p e c i a l i s t s w i t h p a r t i c u l a r k n o w l e d g e , duly t r a i n e d o u t s i d e 
the o r g a n i z a t i o n . In this m o d e l , the o p e r a t i o n of the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n c o m p l e t e l y depends on the special k n o w l e d g e 
o f f e r e d by these p r o f e s s i o n a l s . H e n c e , a high degree of 
a u t o n o m y is n e c e s s a r y . The major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l b u r e a u c r a c y have to do w i t h (i) vertical and 
’horizontal d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .
1 4
 V e r t i c a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is 
r e f e r r e d to the down flow of authority; and h o r i z o n t a l 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is a shift o f , b a s i c a l l y informa1, contro1 to 
n o n - m a n a g e r i a l bodies.
1 5
 W i t h their expert k n o w l e d g e , the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s can o p e r a t e independently from o t h e r s . Such a 
s i t u a t i o n also gives rise to h o r i z o n t a l job s p e c i a l i z a t i o n in 
a professional b u r e a u c r a c y . 
Since its establishment in 1 9 7 5， t h e M T R C has never 
c o n f i n e d itself to one single model of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
s t r u c t u r e . I n s t e a d , the c o r p o r a t i o n has gone through a series 
of transformation by shifting its focus on different 
functional d i v i s i o n s according to the changing e n v i r o n m e n t . 
T h e author here classifies the changes of the M T R C ' s 
organizational s t r u c t u r e into three stages as represented by 
different m o d e l s . The aim is to illustrate the evolution of 
the corporation over the 18 y e a r s . These three stages are: 
p r o f e s s i o n a l b u r e a u c r a t i c mode 1 ( N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 5 to 1 9 7 9 ) ， h y b r i d 
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m o d e l ( F r o m 1979 to m i d - 1 9 8 9 ) , and machine b u r e a u c r a t i c 
dominant m o d e l ( F r o m mid-1989 until p r e s e n t ) . 
THE MTRC T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 
T h e first stage of the M T R C is referred to the period 
during the construct ion of the Modified Initial System(MIS) 
from N o v e m b e r 1975 to 1979. In f a c t , the corporation was split 
into two o r g a n i z a t i o n s , one to undertake the future management 
of the railway, and the other to build the s u b w a y . Since the 
operation of the subway had not yet begun at this p o i n t , the 
basic function of the o r g a n i z a t i o n was confined to the 
construction of the subway. A c c o r d i n g l y , the constructing 
labourers became the operating core of the M T R C . There were 25 
major civil e n g i n e e r i n g c o n t r a c t s , and 11 electrical and 
mechanical engineering ones.
1 8
 T h e situation was closest to 
Mintzberg，s model of a professional bureaucracy w h i c h is 
marked by the special role given to p r o f e s s i o n a l s . 
The development of the M T R w a s based on a contract-out 
arrangement w i t h various architects and e n g i n e e r s . The 
constructing labourers were s u b - c o n t r a c t e d and temporary. 
T h e r e f o r e , their identity might not fall into the 
organizational m e m b e r s h i p of the M T R C . At the height of the 
construct ion, as many as 8,100 w o r k e r s were e m p l o y e d , engaging 
12% of the total human resources of the constructing industry 
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in H o n g Kong.
1 9
 H o w e v e r , the issue of m e m b e r s h i p a r i s i n g from 
this k i n d of c o n t r a c t - o u t a r r a n g e m e n t is b a r e l y a d d r e s s e d by-
w r i t e r s on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l t h e o r y . T h u s , this issue wi 11 not be 
w i t h i n our d i s c u s s i o n . To e l i m i n a t e further c o m p l i c a t i o n s , I 
w i l l s i m p l y r e g a r d all c o n t r a c t - o u t employment as part of the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , the M T R C ' s massive employment of 
" o u t s i d e p r o f e s s i o n a l s " has r e f l e c t e d the m a j o r feature of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l b u r e a u c r a c y . 
D u r i n g the c o n s t r u c t i o n s t a g e , a h i g h degree of 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is u n a v o i d a b l e . According to the general 
definition， c e n t r a l i z a t i o n / d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is a c o m p a r a t i v e 
m e a s u r e m e n t of the extent of d e c i s i o n - m a r k i n g power and 
c o n t r o l , w h e t h e r it is formal or i n f o r m a l , or c o n c e n t r a t e d or 
d i s p e r s e d . A c c o r d i n g to the m u l t i - c o n t r a c t u a l a r r a n g e m e n t , 
c o n s t r u c t i o n is c o m p l e t e l y h a n d e d over to c o n t r a c t o r s w h o are 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s in the c o n s t r u c t i o n field.
2 0
 T h e y n o r m a l l y come 
w i t h their own w o r k i n g crews or u n d e r t a k e new r e c r u i t m e n t . T h e 
v e r t i c a l d i s p e r s e m e n t of power is s i g n i f i c a n t , w h e n a u t h o r i t y 
stays in the individual unit of a construct ion c r e w . The 
c o n t r a c t o r s also possess c o n s i d e r a b l e control over own 
p e r f o r m a n c e , as long as their c o n t r a c t u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are 
f u l f i l l e d . 
In view of v e r t i c a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , it can be carried 
out in the form of power delegation* Such d e l e g a t i o n is 
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s i m i l a r to the h a n d o v e r of power by the H o n g K o n g g o v e r n m e n t 
to the M T R C for its construct ion and o p e r a t i o n of the s u b w a y 
network.
2 2
 This is the identical practice conducted by the 
M T R C w i t h its c o n t r a c t o r s for construct ion of the s u b w a y . 
The construct ion p r o f e s s i o n s also m a n a g e their assigned 
b u i l d i n g area,
2 3
 w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i z e s the horizontal 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the d e v e l o p m e n t . There are n u m e r o u s 
“professions in charge of different technical areas in v a r i o u s 
g e o g r a p h i c a l s i t e s . T h e y are w o r k i n g a u t o n o m o u s l y and 
i n d e p e n d e n t l y from each o t h e r . This division of w o r k 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y h i g h l i g h t s the nature of； horizontal job 
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n n a t u r e in a p r o f e s s i o n a l b u r e a u c r a c y . 
The Mass T r a n s i t Railway C o r p o r a t i o n ( M T R C ) was set up as 
two o r g a n i z a t i o n s in 1975. T h e y were respectively for the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the MIS and the future management of the 
MTR.
2 4
 The former w a s only a p r o v i s i o n a l a u t h o r i t y . It w a s the 
latter(MTRC) became our focus of s t u d y . In the first s t a g e , 
the MTRC，s main o f f i c e of train o p e r a t i o n had not begun and 
the construct ion w o r k was c o n t r a c t e d to outside c o n s o r t i a . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , the role of the M T R C was not very significant 
until the MIS was completed in 1979‘ 
The author refers the second stage as between the actual 
functioning of the Mass Transit R a i l w a y Corporat ion(MTRC) in 
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1979 and the completion of the current MTR system in July 
1989. It was not until 1978/79, a year before the operation of 
the subway b e g a n , that the MTRC started its massive 
recruitment of operating staff and stabilized its 
organizational arrangement.
2 5
 Since the underground railway 
was first introduced to the c o l o n y , special training and 
apprenticeship schemes for subway operation and maintenance 
were offered to e m p l o y e e s . In 1 9 7 9 , the MTRC was formed at the 
considerable size of 2,750 e m p l o y e e s . The employment 
distribution was 1,250 in the operating department, 1,000 in 
project and engineering, and 500 in finance and administration 
respectively.
2 6
 Its organizational structure was designed 
similar to that of W e b e r ' s b u r e a u c r a t i c mode 1, as follows. 
It is generally believed that an organization must be of 
27 
a large size to become a bureaucrat ic model . Due to the 
considerable size of a b u r e a u c r a c y , division of labour is 
n e c e s s a r y . Looking now at the M T R C , its la^ge number of 
employees provides sufficient staff to specialize in specific 
areas of its operations, a c c o r d i n g to the heterogenous nature 
of w o r k s . 
T h e division of labour addresses the complexity of an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n / Complexity is referred to "the degree of 
,»28 
differentiation that exists w i t h i n an organization.’ As the 
author regards the MTRC as a b u r e a u c r a c y , the complexity of 
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the M T R C will be d i s c u s s e d , from the dimensions of v e r t i c a l , 
horizontal and spacial d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s . 
In terms of vertical differentiation,
2 9
 the hierarchical 
pyramid of the MTRC is very c o m p l e x . B r i e f l y , the MTRC is 
structurally headed by the Board of D i r e c t o r s . H o w e v e r , the 
actual decision-making is made by a number of Executive 
D i r e c t o r a t e s who represent v a r i o u s divisions* In dec is ion-
‘making, the suggestions for new internal policies are usually 
initiated by these chief e x e c u t i v e s . According to official 
p r o c e d u r e , the proposed matters w o u l d then be submitted to the 
Board for discuss ion and a p p r o v a l . In fact, most of the 
30 
suggest ions would be rubber s t a m p e d . 
W i t h i n each d i v i s i o n , there is an individual hierarchy 
headed by an Executive D i r e c t o r a t e . Respectively in the 
o p e r a t i n g , engineering and p r o p e r t y divisions of the M T R C , 
each of the division is horizontal ly broken do,wn into two to 
three subdivisions so as to handle more specific w o r k s . 
Vertically the division is n o r m a l l y stratified into seven 
levels of employment positions (see Diagram 5) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
the highest "authority" remains with the Board and the 
Executive D i r e c t o r a t e s . This structure shows the centralized 
nature of the M T R C . 
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Diagram 5 Hierarchical arrangement of the M T R C ' s Operation and r.?--：：: 
Property Divisions 一 
OPERATION DIVISION 
Train Operating Department 
Vice Supervisor of Train Service 
I
 L
 r _ r
 :
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Train Service Officer Control Room Officer 
Division Personnel Manager Train Service Manager 
r— 1
 r 
Train Service Supervisor Control Room Chief Supervisor Train Service Supervisor 
Division Personnel Supervisor Train Service Supervisor Stat ion Supervisor 
Schedule Supervisor Train Service Officer • 
Division Personnel Officer I Stat ion Officer 





Assistant Engineer Technical Supervisor Technical Supervisor 
Apprenticed Engineer Supervisor Supervisor 
Officer Senior Technician 
Senior Technician Technician 
Technician Apprenticed Technician 、 




I . , 
Senior Property Manager Construction Planning Manager 
Property Manager Construct ion Manager 
Assistant Property Manager In-house Appliance Engineer 
Property Supervisor Maintenance Foreman Surveyor 
Assistant Property Supervisor Assistant Maintenance Foreman Assistant Surveyor 
Property Management Assistant Maintenance Workers Construction Supervisor 
(Source: MTRC, MTRC Recruitment Brochure
r
 1992/93) , 
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It is generally believed that vertical and horizontal 
differentiations are not independently constructed. Yet， the 
differentiations are always interrelated in the design of an 
organizational structure. Returning to the horizontal 
% 
differentiation of the MTRC, the corporation is composed of 
the, major divisions of operation, finance, project, 
f\ • » 一 
e n g i n e e r i n g a n d administra七ion.。 The employees, especially 
七 h o s e who need specific knowledge to perform their duties, are 
offered professional training. The training is basically 
distinguished from one division to another/" ； T h e growth of 
employees was the most significant be七ween 1979 to 1982, from 
2,750 to 5,112, with an average increase of 790 staff 
annually.
3 3
 While its size was expanding, the MTRC kept 
reorganizing its structure. Mostly 七 h e organization created 
new divisions to cover specific areas, such as its special 
/ 
recruitment of staff for the "estate management and property 
A » 
development" division since 1980•巧 As a consequence,七 he 
division of labour became increasing detailed, and this has 
enlarged the horizon七ally differentiated network of the 
corporation. 
The MTRC also fulfils the final dimension of spacial 
differentia七ion. Here spacial differentiation is defined as 
"the geographical dispersion of off ices , plants and staff . 
The administrative headquarters of the MTRC is located above 
the depot at Kowloon Bay station. In addition,七here are a 
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total number of 38 stations adjoining 19 property 
developments， together with 3 maintenance depots at Kowloon 
Bay, Tsuen Wan and Chai Wan to accommodate its staff of 
a n 
various divisions Therefore, the geographical dispersion 
of the MTRC spreads through most of the urban regions of Hong 
Kong • 
In sum, the vertical, horizontal and spacial 
differentiations of the MTRC reflects the highly complex 
3? 
organizational structure of the corpora七ion •
1
 Such a 
c o m p l e x i t y is derived from the well defined division of labour 
in the MTRC, which also highlights one of the features of 
Weber's bureaucracy. 
工七 is believed that "division of labour tends to be 
associated with a high degree of formalization 七o facilitate 




 Accordingly, the high degree of 
formalization
3 9
 in the MTRC is designed for better integration 
of its very defined division of labour. Because of the special 
but different technical needs of individual divisions, the 
tasks and activities of employees have been well standardized. 
According to the position arrangement of the MTRC, job nature 
has been differentiated and is well defined. Hence, each 
member of the corporation is assigned his/her special duty to 
be incorporated with others, and more importantly designed to 
avoid overlaps of works. 
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Because of the high complexity, centralization and 
formalization within the MTRC, the organization has underlined 
some of the major characteristics of bureaucracy. These are 
(i) division of power ( ii) well-defined authority hierarchy 
and (iii)high formaliza七ion. .Now we will discuss other 
conditions for a bureaucracy. 
Given the technical activities of the MTRC, the company's 
consideration of qualifications and competence can be expected 
for its promotion and irecrui七merit of staff. For example, the 
MTRC engineering apprenticeship programme lasts for three to 
four y e a r s . 4 0 Therefore, another condition of bureaucracy, 
(v)employment decisions based on merit, is satisfied. 
41 
The varieties of 七 r a i n i n g programmes offered to staff ‘ 
• 
show 七 h e MTRC's desire for long term employment. The 
.:
 :
- “i " 
corporation's investment in its employees is considerable.' 
The MTRC
J
 s devotion to human resources has been recognized by 
the public. For example, the company was rewarded with the 
"Excellence in Training Award" by 七 h e Hong Kong Management 
4 3 
Association in 1991 and 1992. 
Under the cloud of the unforeseeable political future of 
Hong Kong, however, the whole labour market suffers from brain 
drain. In the year of 1989 particularly, emigration reached a 
high point. The labour turnover of the MTRC was at a peak of 
6 7 
2 3%^ in the year. Human resource losses were particularly 
among the professionals and those who are holding senior posts 
with precious skills and experience. Despite the design of 
career tracks by the MTRC, the problem mainly arises from the 
employees' side. The.labour shortage remains a crisis as 1997 
is approaching, the average length of service of MTRC 
4 5 
employees is only 6.8 years. 
Despite identifying numerous bureaucratic features,七he 
impersonal nature of bureaucracy is not observed in the MTRC 
by the author. The impersonal feature is mainly derived from 
七 h e rigid compliance of rules and regulations by an 
organization. There are two basic indicators of 
d e p e r s o n a l i z a t i o n suggested by Robbins. Firstly, the uniform 
application of penalties to all members of 七 h e organization. 
Secondly, the separation of organizational and private lives 
of organizational members. .Failure to see the impersonal 
feature in the MTRC could be attributed 七o two reasons. First 
of all, it is impracticable to examine both the "uniform 
application of penalties" and the "separation of 
organizational and personal lives”. Nor has the measurement of 
"impersonality" been clearly defined by Weber himself. Another 
reason could be that depersonalization has not developed to 
its full extent in the case of the MTRC. 
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P a r t i c u l a r l y after the 1984 s t r i k e s , a series of internal 
47 
reforms w e r e e m p l o y e d in order to improve labour r e l a t i o n . 
For e x a m p l e , the c o r p o r a t i o n w o u l d constantly and a c t i v e l y 
invite its employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and other staff to 
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informal gatherings and other social f u n c t i o n s . This may 
indicate the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s intent ion to establish a p e r s o n a l , 
"amicable" r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h its staff beyond the w o r k i n g 
o n e s . Since 1987， the o r g a n i z a t i o n has put its o p e r a t i n g 
, p r i n c i p l e s into the slogan of "Customer S e r v i c e , Respect for 
the Individual , and On T i m e and W i t h i n Budget."
4 9
 "Respect for 
the Individual" is s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r r e d to the gratitude from 
the corporation to individual s t a f f , as well as the equal 
status of its o r g a n i z a t i o n a l m e m b e r s .
5 0
 A l s o , the M T R C has 
claims that "we also strive to be one of the best e m p l o y e r s . 
O n l y by serving our staff we 11 , can we expect our staff to 
serve our customers well,"
5 1
 In the s t a t e m e n t , customer 
service is s t r e s s e d . In v i e w of the action and p r o p a g a t i o n 
taken by the M T R C , the c o r p o r a t i o n is very likely to e s t a b l i s h 
a personal relationship w i t h its staff and also 'its c u s t o m e r s . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the low degree of a d e p e r s o n a l i z a t i o n in the 
MTRC m a y do the o r g a n i z a t i o n m o r e good than h a r m . 
B e s i d e s the rigidity of b u r e a u c r a c y , the impersonal 
character of b u r e a u c r a c y is a n o t h e r m u c h challenged point by 
s c h o l a r s . Robert K . Merton has made further criticism on 
W e b e r ' s b u r e a u c r a c y , focusing on the impersonal 
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characteristic: 
The impersonal treatment of affairs which are at 
times of great personal significance to the client 
gives rise to the charge of "arrogance" and 
"haughtiness" of the bureaucrat....Thus, with 
respect to the relations between officials and 
clientele, one structural sources of conflict is 
七 he pressure for formal and impersonal treatment 
when individual perspnalized consideration is 
desired by the client.' 
Examining the commercial nature of 七 h e MTRC, a good 
cliental relationship is important for its survival in the 
market. Relative 七o any of the other I governmental 
institutions,七he MTRC has more personal contact with 七 h e 
public . Direct con七act includes Passengers Liaison Mee七ings in 
the form of "Coffee Evenings" since 1991, together with others 
such as the installation of opinion boxes and the distribution 
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of suggestion forms throughout the subway stations•
 u
•Hence， 
the most criticized depersonalization of bureaucracy can be 
minimized in the MTRC. -
A HYBRID MODEL 
Looking at the internal structure of the MTRC alone, the 
corpora七ion has just been identified as a machine bureaucracy. 
Nevertheless, the professional bureaucracy of the firs七 phase 
remains so long as the contract-out arrangement for MTR 
cons七ruction continues. As a consequence, a hybrid of 
professional and machine bureaucracies emerge in 七 h e second 
phase of the MTRC's history. The major distinction between 
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professional and machine bureaucracies is that the former is 
mainly composed of outsiders, whereas the operation of the 
• 5 4 
latter strongly relies on its the organizational hierarchy. 
The MIS project which proceeds from November 1975 to 
early 1980 was the largest construc 七 ion stage on 七 he MTR. 
Hence,七 he professional bureaucratic feature was the most 
• dominant in 七 b i s period. In the later development of the Tsuen 
Wan Extension(TWE) , the Island Line(ISL) and the latest 
Eastern Harbour Crossing, the construction size was getting 
smaller. 8,100 workers participated in 七 h e MIS, engaging 12% 
of the total work force in construction business in Hong Kong. 
The figure dropped to 10% and 6% respectively for 七 h e TWE and 
ISL. In 七 h e Eastern Harbour Crossing, the employment reduced 
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to only 1,750 workers. 
• 
On 七 h e other hand,七he growth of employees in the MTRC is 
continuous and significant.. The situation indicates 七 h e fading 
of the professional bureaucratic feature while the machine 
bureaucracy is expanding. Despite the changing proportion of 
the professional and machine elements, the hybrid picture 
remained as long as the constructions continued until the mid-
1989， when the current MTR network was completed. 
Since the mid-1989, the MTRC has entered into the third 
stage of its evolution. The organizational size of the MTRC 
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# 
continues to expand, with the growth of employees, from 
2, 750
55
 to presently over 5 ,000.
57
 With regard to its 
organizational structure, the MTRC is close七it is ever been 
to a machine bureaucracy albeit with a small portion of 
professional bureaucratic elements. 
The m a j o r , c h a r a c七 e r i s t i c s of machine bureaucracy such as 
division of labour, formality and centralization of power have 
been all identified in the MTRC. Since the completion of 
construction work, the business activities of the corporation 
remain t r a i n opera七ion and property management. Following 七 h e 
withdrawal of 七 h e outside professional of contractors and 
civil engineers, the m a c h i n e bureaucratic element expanded and 
is now dominant in the corporation. 
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The operation of the MTR is fully computerized. 
Therefore , the corporation is very technology-based, and it is 
an important task of the engineering department to maintain 
the normal operation of the machines. Accordingly, the 
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七 e c h n o s t r u c 七 u r e of the operations engineering department' is 
a key par七 of the organization. The unit undertakes the safety 
and smooth operation of the subway by providing "a safe, 
"G U 
reliable and efficient service to passengers. As m a n y as 
three-fifths of the total number of employee are in the 
operation's engineering' departmen七，’ which shows the 
significance of this specific technostructure in the MTRC. 
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The operation of the MTR is highly automated by the 
o2 ‘ . 
computer control and train operating systems.
u u
 The basic work 
in stations such as ticket issuance, fare collection and 
recently money change are also conducted by various types of 
machines. Nevertheless, operating staff remain necessary as 
manual labour is still required, to con七rol and supervise the 
machines, and other customer services. With the assistance of 
m a c h i n e r y , the work of the operating department is simplified. 
However, their tasks simultaneously become more routine and . , . . . ‘ • j 
highly mechanic. Therefore, such a routine operation has 
highlighted one of the characteristics of a machine 
bureaucracy. 
The train operating department and the property division 
are the operating core of the MTRC, the former has 七 h e second 
.... -gn 




There is a particular worry in a machine bureaucracy that 
"the informal power of the technostructure is gained largely 
at the expense of the operators. The seizure of informal 
power is likely to undermine the relationship between the two 
sections. In 七 h e MTRC, the operating core and 七 h e 
technostructure have been prudently incorporated, by adjoining 
the train operating and engineering departments into one 
single division of operation .* The operation division is the 
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largest section of the MTRC accommodating 3,852 staff out of 
the total of 5,103 employees. The author believes that not 
only can such a structural design eliminate the risk of 
hostility between the two main departments, but also it can 
even promote significantly their technical cooperation. 
In spite of the dominance of the machine b u r e a u c r a c y , the 
organic input of a professional bureaucracy remains even after 
the completion of the MTR development. The . professional 
b u r e a u c r a t i c feature can be best observed in the middle-line 
level of the corporation. At the peak of the subway 




 The completion of 
cons七ruction was followed by massive lay offs of the temporary 
and subcontracted labour. Nevertheless, the MTRC invited some 
• 
of those at the managerial level to j'oin -the corporation even 
after their contracts had been terminated • Therefore,七here 
has been a significant expansion of the middle-line which 
contributes to the list of over 200 managers at middle and 
senior level.
0 8
 Unlike the other parts of the MTRC, the 
middle-line people employed under this particular situation 
were professionally trained and indoctrinated outside the 
organization. Hence, the professional bureaucratic feature has 
become the strongest in the middle-line. 
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In a p r o f e s s i o n a l b u r e a u c r a c y , the recruitment of e x p e r t s 
. 6 9 
can save the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s budget for v o c a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n . 
H o w e v e r , the situation m a y give rise to the p r o b l e m of 
control.
7 0
 It is b e l i e v e d that the p r o f e s s i o n a l will persist 
w i t h their own norms and values , as they have been trained and 
indoctrinated o u t s i d e the o r g a n i z a t i o n . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s may place their own v a l u e s ahead of the interest 
of the organization，
7 1
 p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n the two are in 
conflict* The M T R C has o r g a n i z e d a Human Resources Management 
P r o g r a m m e for its w o r k e r s .
7 2
 A series of in-house training and 
indoctrination
7 3
 takes place to improve staff q u a l i t y . The 
author speculates that the p r o g r a m m e s are to strengthen the 
moral commitment of staff， and increase their loyalty to the 
organi z a t i o n . 
In the management p r o g r a m m e , development centres w e r e 
p r o v i d e d to 48 senior managers, in 1991. In the same year， 
there has been a "20 D i v i s i o n Days" to train for better 
customer services of employees.
7 4
 The author b e l i e v e s that the 
p r o g r a m m e s could help to indoctrinate the outside 
professionals， and also s t r e n g t h e n the organizational spirit 
of other w o r k e r s . 
The MTRC is currently p r e p a r i n g for the n e w extensions of 
the Lantau Line(LAL) and Airport E x p r e s s ( A E L ) • It is the 
author's speculation that the p r o f e s s i o n a l b u r e a u c r a c y will 
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return, as soon as the construction begins. A plan has been 
made to arrange for 19 major civil work contracts, and 39 
？ C 
electrical and mechanical ones. " The extension will also 
double the size of the current MTR ne七work•…‘Hence,七he 
professional bureaucratic feature will be more outstanding 
than ever in the airport extension. It was 七 h e expectation in 
1991 that the tender for the first principal contract would 
take place in mid-1993. However, the project remains pending 
as long as the Sino — British talks over 七 he Chek Lap Kok 
airport linger on. Since the new extension is part of the 




Through the dimensron of organizational structure,'this . 
« 
chap七er has tried to distinguish "the MTRC from a public 
bureau. Therefore, the corporation can avoid some of the 
shortcomings in Weber's bureaucracy, such as rigidity and 
depersonalization of organization. As noted by the author, its 
structure is adjusted according to the changing environment 
and its own needs. Moreover, the personal treatment of the 
MTRC towards its employee and customers could well rectify the 
public image of "arrogance" and "haughtiness"" of a 
bureaucracy• 
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Over 18 years, the transformation of the MTRC has been 
based on the models of machine and professional bureaucracies. 
Since both of the models originate from 七 h e bureaucracy of 
Weber, some of the characteristics and also the merits of 
bureaucracy could be reserved in 七he MTRC. Specialization of 
works is one of the major contributions of Weber' s 
bureaucracy, .which can enhance the efficiency of an 
organization. The similar idea of division of labour is also 
strongly supported by the classical economist, Adam Smith. In 
the hybrid model of the MTRC, the organic- input of a 
professional bureaucracy is brought into the machine 
bureaucratic structure of the organization. At the same time, 
the MTRC can skilfully avoid the potential deficiency of the 
two models. In a machine bureaucracy, most threats arise from 
the discord between the operating core and the 
/ 
七 e c h n o s 七 : r u c t u r e • To eliminate 七 h e potential discord, the MTRC 
has s k i l f u l l y combined the two elements i.e. the . train 
operating and engineering departments • On the other hand, the 
biggest shortcoming of a professional bureaucracy arises from 
七 he potential defiance of outside professionals. Possibly 
perceiving the problem, the MTRC frequently provides its staff 
with in-house indoctrination and training. The corporation is 
quite capable of reacting promptly to different environment 
and various problems (please also see Appendix II). 
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On the bottom line, the author attributes the successful 
management of the MTRC to its non-governmental nature. Because 
the flexibility of the private sector can be brought in, the 
MTRC can readjust its organizational structure and ether 
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CHAPTER 4 
DECISION MAKING ANALYSIS 
The focus in this chapter is placed oh the decision-
making process of the MTR. Since the MTRC is designed as a 
non-governmental organization, its decisional process can 
cross the public and private boundaries. This chapter will 
suggest that it is most prudential of the Hong Kong government 
to make the full use of the hybrid nature of the MTRC to 
achieve its desired goals. With the flexible design of the 
corporation, the governmeri 七 can locate the MTRC at the most 
favourable position to justify its decisions. More skilfully, 
many government political goals can be depoliticized and 
converted into commercial objectives, through the privatized 
- MTRC. 
This chap七ei? will discuss what goals does the government 
strive to achieve. What is the difference between 七he policy 
analysis of public and private sectors? Finally, how does 七he 
government make use of the MTRC to achieve its goals? 
In d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , a person would usually set more than 
o n e
 desired goal. Here we refer to, the set of goals as a goal 
mix. In the private sector, the goal mix of a commercial firm 
’85 
is b o t h explicit and simple b e c a u s e its focus is placed on 
" p r o f i t a b i l i t y " . In c o n t r a s t , government's goal mix is far 
c o m p l i c a t e d w h e n pub lie p o l i c i e s are usual 1y i n v o l v e d , 
Most of the time, g o v e r n m e n t ' s goal mix w o u l d comprise 
two levels. At the primary level, the basic goals are open to 
the p u b l i c . H o w e v e r , they are n o r m a l l y put in an ambiguous 
c o n t e x t , in order to justify the behaviour of the government 
a g e n t s . As James W i l s o n has s u g g e s t e d : 
an a g e n c y ' s [referring to government agency] primary goal 
[or basic goal] m a y be clear or v a g u e , but its p r i m a c y 
u s u a l l y is not in d i s p u t e . 'Educate c h i I d r e n , ^ p r e v e n t 
crime，，，maintain relations w i t h other nations，. 
At the secondary level, tacit elements may be involved. 
Usually， the secondary goals are disguised by government at 
the b a s i c level* 
In the M T R , the g o v e r n m e n t ' s goal-mix covers both the 
p o l i c y and the commercial a r e a s . At the primary level, they 
are r e s p e c t i v e l y the objectives of transport p o l i c y , u r b a n 
p l a n n i n g and p r o f i t a b i l i t y . A c c o r d i n g to the M T R C O r d i n a n c e , 
the M T R is " intended to be set up in pursuance of the 
A 
transport policy of the g o v e r n m e n t“ In addition，
 1
 the 
C o r p o r a t i o n shall conduct its b u s i n e s s according to prudent 
c o m m e r c i a l principles."
3
 At the primary level, the ends and 
means for the MTR are c l e a r - c u t . T h e r e f o r e , it could be 
i n t e r e s t i n g to explore the implicit, or secondary level 
86 
political goals of the government. 
In regard to policy analysis, Charles E. Lindblom has 
suggested two different approaches in his A Strategy Decision 
(1963): the synoptic model and incrementalism , In fact, the 
two models are the best description of respective decisional 
making in public and private spheres. 
The synoptic model is similar to the idea of 
{ . . . 4 . . . . . 
comprehensive rationality in decision making analysis.‘It is 
assumed that a decision-maker initiates with an order of 
his/her values. According to the ranked values, the possible 
policies are drafted. The decision-maker tends to foresee the 
outcome of each alternative and conducts a comprehensive and 
meticulous comparison among the policy alternatives. After 
rating the policy outcomes, it is believed that' the best 
• possible policy can be reached，—and thus this selected policy 
will fulfil the maximum values of the decision maker. In this 
sense, the means and ends of a p o l i c y are clear-cut and well 
defined. From my viewpoint, the purpose of defining values is 
for gaining public support and justifying decision. Since 
"values" are the bases for a decision, the synoptic model is 
the best d e s c r i p t i o n of government decision making. 
In contrast with the "synoptic" conception, the 
丨’ incremental" • approach makes decisions on the basis of 
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,"problems. It is assumed that when a program is basically 
settled, no further time will be consumed to redefine the 
ends. Instead of drastic change, incremental variations will 
be made when problems are encountered along the way. The 
variations are the modest adjustments conducted in a gradual 
manner, aimed at particular p r o b l e m s A s the incremental 
model will be complicated by a series of problem-solving 
pol icies, its means and ends - cannot be as comprehensive as in 
the synoptic model. Since the incremental model aims at the 
realistic situations and reacts responsively, it seems to be 
the most adapted to the changing environment of the commercial 
world. Hence, incremen七alism becomes 七 h e most appropriate for 
private sector's dec is ion making. 
THE MTR AS A RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE POLICY-MAKING CASE 
* Before the pulling out、of thQ Japanese consortium in 
1975， the policy-making of the MTR resembled a synoptic model 
of government policy analysis. First of all , the ends and 
means of a decision had been clearly defined by the government 
ever since 七 he decision was made. More importantly, the 
government in-i七iated the decision with "values" , placing its 
priority on public interest. More specifically,七he MTRC was 
assigned the mission to resolve the social problem of traffic 
congestion." The priority was once again affirmed in statutory 
form of the MTRC Ordinance. In the case of conflict, public 
’88 
. . 3 
interest should be placed in priority of commercial g a m . 
Considering the rational approach, the preparation work for 
七 h e MTR was abundant. The Hong Kong gdvernmeri七 carried out a 
, 3 
series of studies and other preparation work for the MTR，。 
such as the Comprehensive Transport Study in 19 76. Therefore, 
the MTR was s e e m i n g l y designed by the government as a result 
of a comprehensiy-e rational decision, along the line of a 
"synoptic" conception. 
The essence of synoptic concept is . its accurate 
prediction upon the outcome of each alternative, but the 
environment in reality may not be as stable as the model has 
assumed. In 七 he MTR, the sudden withdrawal of the Japanese 
consortium in 1975 has questioned the policy actor's ability 
to predict and anticipa七e the decision-making process. Even if 
• • 
the prediction for the policy ou七come is accurate， an. 
i n i t i a l l y de七ermined policy is not necessarily feasible if 七 h e 
environment is u n e x p e c t e d l y varied. Consequently, the MTR 
system initially decided
1 0
 could not be completely fulfilled 
but was immediately replaced by the MIS. 
At that point, the withdrawal of the Japanese consortium 
was not that simple. The incident entailed other sequential 
problems such as financial cost. There was a p o l i c y 
alternative to abandon the project. Nevertheless, the Hong 
Kong, government had chosen to stay keen with its initial 
’89 
decision of subway construction. When the project sustained, 
the government's goal mix was complicated by additional 
targets mainly to resolve the financial crisis arisen from the 
Japanese withdrawal. As a solution, there were a couple of new 
decisions made by 七 h e Hong Kong government. The first decision 
was 七 o contract the original size of the MTR in order to 
alleviate the financial cost. Secondly, it was to alter the 
initial plan for a single agreement with a multi—contractual 
arrangemen七 to widen the financial base for funding. 
Consequently, the adjustments had resulted in 七 h e present MIS. 
To explain 七 h e decision leading to 七 h e MIS, the author would 
like 七o refei? to the incremental problem solving of the Hong-
Kong government. 
‘ - ' . / 
INCREMENTALISM IN THE CASE OF MIS •. 
. ' " v - • - - :.-• - - _ • - . - • - -——-• •• 
In view of the remedial nature of the MIS,七he problem 
resolving function of incrementalism can be observed at the 
first glance. With regard to the physical variation upon the 
MTR, the adjustment was simply a truncated version of the 
initial plan so as to advance the financial f e a s i b i l i t y of 
c o n s t r u c t i o n . Nevertheless, the overall decision of 七 h e MTR 
had been p r e s e r v e d . Therefore, the MIS has reflected its 
modest adjustment feature of incrementalism. Even when the 
initial subway network had been shortened, the MIS remains 七 h e 
largest c o n s t r u c t i v e portion of the present MTR system. The 
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port ion also required the heaviest investment among the three 
subway routes, 
In terms of the government.' s goal-mix, there was an 
additional goal of resolving the sudden financial crisis which 
the MIS brought about. However, the change of goal-mix 
simultaneously blurred the boundaries of means and ends in the 
decision. In the rush to make a decision on the MIS， the 
government had no time to revise its values or goals. 
Nevertheless, the comprehensive goal of transport policy 
always sustained. 
In view of the decisional process, an incremental model 
can best explain the sudden replacement of the MIS in the 
MTR's history. However, the only argument to challenge 七 h e 
• 
incremental feature of 七 h e MIS can be found in the process of 
adjustment-making. Bargains of interest groups" is 七 he 
special political leverage used in an incremental model. 
However, the MTR decision appears to be controlled by the 
government all the way. The role of the interest groups was so 
minimal that not even a small adjustment of the MIS was to be 
left for the public to decide. Regardless of the political 
leverage, the MIS was an incremental adjustment by nature. In 
conclusion, the case of the MIS has suggested that an 
incremental adjustment can be used to fill the gap of the 
synoptic decision of government in the MTR. At the bottom 
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line, decisional flexibility is derived from the commercial 
nature of the MTRC which brings about the incremental strategy 
of the private sector. 
The MIS was an immediate solution announced within weeks 
after the Japanese withdrawal. In view of the very short time 
on the MIS decision, the comprehensiveness of the government 
in considering the full range of alternatives was highly 
questionable. Moreover, the risk of the decision was 
particularly high, as 七 h e incident arose f rom the global 
frustration of the firs七 oil crisis in 1974. Hence, the 
decision has even been criticized as a "million-dollar 
disaster/"
2
 However, the decision was not n e c e s s a r i l y 
irrational. According to Charles Lindblom: 
Decisions marked by large change and quite 
imperfect understanding, are not rare, even if.they 
are not the typical instrument of policy-making. 
Nor are such decisions made only in error or by 
foolish decision-makers. On .the contrary, such 
decisions are sometimes inescapable, forced on 
decision-makers by circumstances . In addition, such 
decisions are sometimes deliberately taken by 
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s because the potential rewards seem 
attractive enough to outweigh the perils posed by 
imperfect understanding.
1 
In c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the time and cost that had already 
been endowed up to 七 h e Japanese withdrawal, it would be more 
rational to go for the construction. Early in 1976， the 
government had projected that the MIS ridership would reach 1 
< i 
million by the mid-1980s.“Therefore,七he potential economic 
performance of 七 h e MTR had been a rough e x p e c七 a t i o n of the 
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government, despite a change upon the initial subway network. 
More i m p o r t a n t l y , the pressing' need to resolve the alarming 
traffic nightmare had provided a good justification to the 
rushed decision of the MIS. Also, when we can consider that 
the present MTR ridership is the world's highest, “’ the 
correctness of the government's decision is affirmed. 
AIRPORT VERSUS JUNK BAY 
Another important adjustment upon the MTR would be the 
Junk Bay project.
1 6
 The MTR extension to the Junk Bay was one 
. ]7 
of the three proposed railway projects. ' The proposal had 
been put under the Second Comprehensive Transpor七 Study(CT2) 
project of the government. The construc七ion had been planned 
<• A 
to commence in 七 he early 1 9 9 0 s . H o w e v e r ,七 he Junk Bay 
• 
project was d r o p p e d , due to the change of the city planning 
t\ t " - ' " " 
by 七 h e government.^ I七 was a cost—benefit prediction 七 h a t the 
extension could not be s e l f - s u p p o r t i v e . The cancellation had 
also reflected the change of government's goal-mix. In the 
decision, profitability had been placed ahead of other ends. 
If t-he MTRC were a government institution, the Junk Bay 
extension could have been built subject to political pressure. 
Since the n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l M T R C was discharged from the kind 
of political responsibility, through which the government 
could readjust its goal-mix more flexibly. Also based on the 
MTRC commercial principle, the cancellation could be easily 
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justi fied. 
The Junk Bay project had been scrapped before it reached 
its maturity. Hence, the adjustment was much less significant 
than the MIS. In fact, the nature of the decision completely 
differs from that of the MIS. The present case is simply an 
autonomous decision of the government, unlike the MIS which 
was a reluctant solution to the uncontrollable changes of 
environmen七.From an economic dimension, the cancellation of 
the Junk Bay extension could be a rational decision of the 
Hong Kong government. 
In place of the 2.5 billion dollar Junk Bay extension, it 
is the Hong Kong governmeri七，s decision for the MTR extension 
to 七 h e Chek Lap Kok( Airport Express Line) and Tung 
Chung(Lantau Line).
2 2
 It is desired that the Chek Lap Kok new 
airport can be supplemen七ed by the new subway extensions of 
the LAL and the AEL
23
 . However, the feasibility of 七 h e 
extensions is determined by a successful construction of the 
Chek Lap Kok airpor•七• Even the realization of the airport 
project does no七guarantee a successful completion of the new 
subway extension.^ Therefore, the consideration upon the 
Airport Express Line(AEL) and Lantau Line(LAL) is not simply 
a domestic affair of the government of transport policy or 
urban planning. The construct ion is directly associated with 
the airport project talks between the sovereignties of the 
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British and the Chinese governments. 
The railway construction, estimated to cost HKS 3 3.5 
f) r 
billion by the day of its completion, would be a very costly 
and significant decision. In view of the firm attitude taken 
by the Hong Kong officials, the Chek Lap Kok package could be 
another synoptic decision by the British and Hong Kong-
authorities to achieve their important and long term political 
goals. Government officials have defended the future airport 
？广 ： 
by saying that the surrounding cities
u
 are insufficient to 
supplement the metropolitan city of Hong Kong, To a certain 
5 7 
extent, a "five-star airport" and the luxury subway 
extension of Chek Lap Kok can strengthen the economic 
competi七iveness of Hong Kong. Wi七h the super-infrastructure, 
七 he city would be better equipped to compete with the 
burgeoning cities of the surrounding Special Economic Zones of 
China. More importantly, the hefty .construction of Chek Lap 
Kok will capture more capital in the city, when Hong Kong will 
resort to more banking and financial facilitation广 
Based on the enormous economic interest, the city can 
23 
securely maintain her future p o l i t i c a l stability after 1997. 
Strong opposition has been made by Beijing towards the new MTR 
extension, worried that the hefty financial burden may be 
o f、 
passed on to the future government of Hong K o n g . L o c a l l y , 
some legislators are skeptical about the financial capability 
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of the MTRC for its operation of Chek Lap Kok."
1
 Other public 
transport corporations also question the necessity for the new 
subway, as twenty-two buses will travel between Central and 
y) 
Chek Lap Kok per hour.". 
There are speculations 七 h a t the hefty cons七;ructions aire 
simply to siphon Hong Kong treasure back to the U.K., before 
‘ . ’ [ . . � -the parent state terminates her fortune in 1 9 9 7 I n view of 
the MTR's history, the U.K. constructors and businessmen must 
34 
share a significant chunk in new p r o j e c t s A c c o r d i n g l y , the 
above criticism is not groundless. In addition, as a 
legislator, Emily Lau has pointed out, for the Chek Lap Kok 
extension, the majority of contracts have been tendered to the 
n ， “ . 35 
U.K. related corporations. 
In fact， the genuine and ultimate intention behind the 
• - - _ MTR new extension remains unknown to any of us. Regardless of 
the accuracy of the accusations , the Chek Lap Kok decision has 
shown that the governnien七，s goal-mix has been readjusted and 
transcended to a higher level of political consideration. To 
jus 七 ify the decision, the government has made use of the 
privatized nature of the MTRC once again.工n response to the 
accusations, the Bri七ish government has defended 七 h i s saying 
" 七 h e independent and privately operated (du li si ying) MTRC 
will manage the financial arrangement, which is beyond the 




political issue has been skilfully depoliticized through 
commercialization. Hence, the issuance of the MTRC post-1997 
0 7 
maturity bond is in due course！”‘ 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This .chapter has suggested that the non—governmental 
nature of 七 h e MTRC can allow for more elasticity in government 
decision-making . First of all, it has been discovered that the 
goal-mix of government can be changed from timb 七o time/ To 
achieve the new goal-mix, the hybrid nature of the MTRC can 
allow the government more room to justify its new decisions. 
Also, since the goal-mix is not constant, a definite order of 
values as assumed by synoptic m o d e l may be impractical in the 
real world. Besides, the MTR story has suggested that the 
presumption of predictability in synoptic ,model is 
unrealistic .• To supplement the synoptic policy-analysis, the 
MTRC has used the incremental strategy of the private sector. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the privatized MTRC is 
always a useful tool of the government to insulate its 
decisions from m a n y wanted political influences, in order to 
balance the political and economic rationalities of the public 
policies (please also see Appendix III). Therefore, as 1997 is 
approaching, the government may make more uses of the 
independent and commercialized MTRC to depoliticize the most 
sensitive political issues in the colony. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MODES OF POLICY PARTICIPATION 
工七 is important to shed light on who make decision and 
execute it in the case of the MTRC, since we have, in Chapter 
1， discussed how policy is made. Who are the main actors in 
the decision-making process? What are the salient 
characteristics of the relationship among those actors? Which 
mode of p o l i c y participation is preferred to others? To answer 
these questions, we have normative concern as much as 
empirical issues in the study of the MTRC. 
Without nuich 七 hought， one might be inclined to the 
position that 七 h e wider sharing of decision-making power is 
• 
m o s t d e s i r a b l e in normative, sense and valid in factual terms. 
: In A m e r i c a n politics, for "instance, .pluralism is upheld as an 
"unchallenged, normative theory"
1
 in government decision-
making. Most of the time, scholars would associate "pluralism" 
with "democracy" and "liberalism", as representing something 
f o r p u b l i c good. In his creation of polyarchy, Dahl strongly 
upheld the political idea of pluralism.
2
. In the pluralist 
a 
theory of democracy , the role of the group is pivotal.、 In 
the 1940s, Robert K. Merton suggested that "The efficacy of 
social structure depends ultimately upon infusing group 
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participants with appropriate attitudes and sentiments."" 
Although Hong Kong is within the influence of British 
political culture which is taken as "Western", there are 
considerable differences between American and British mode of 
policy participation. As an antithesis,工 would like to argue 
that the elitist-corporat1st model rather than pluralist 
theory of d e m o c r a c y； is appropriate to characterize the 
decision-making process in the case of the MTR. In fact, it 
will be discovered that the popular participation is minimal 
in the MTR，s history. More importantly, through the non-
...governmental and independent nature of the MTRC, the 
government can isolate its decisions from public 
"in七erference"• Besides, it is also worthnoting the mode of 
policy participation in London, In order to contrast the 
political situation of the colony with her parent state. 
POLICY PARTICIPATION MODELS 
The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process is generally separa七ed in七o 
three stages: initia七ion， consideration and implementation. In 
regard to the mode of p o l i c y .part ic ipat ion， there are three 
basic typologies of pluralism, elitism, and corporatism."' In . 
elitism, a policy is initiated by a cohesive upper class. 
Policy will often be considered in favour of the special class 
by government ； so that its implementation will be left to 
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unfettered power of the private sector. Corporatism is defined 
as "an arrangement of limited monopolies that are given to 
private organizations on a discriminatory basis, in exchange 
for the cooperation and support they give to the state. "
D 
Under this system, the political or technocratic elite is in 
the role of initiator. To gain support, government will 
collaborate with private organizations for both consideration 
and implementation. N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e standpoint taken by 
government remains neutral. Finally, rivalry among the 
competitive "groups" features pluralism, in which the role of 
interest groups, often together with private citizens, goes 
all the way from initiation to implementation. Hence, the 
f j 
function of government is minimal in the system. 
Comparing the three typologies， the competition in 
/ 
pluralism could well contrast the harmony and coherence in the 
two former models. However, in. the complex political 
environment of the real world, it is easier to find a hybrid 
structure in any country than a pure topology of one single 
model. Even though Hong Kong is a capitalist city similar to 
New York, Paris and London, 七 h e four cities are not 
necessarily identical in terms of their political cultures. It 
has been shown that 七 h e post—industrial city of New York is 
close to a c o r p o r a t i s t - p l u r a l i s t hybrid; Paris is mobilizing 
c o r p o r a 七 i s m ， and London is liberal corporatism.
5
 Regardless 
of the r e l i a b i l i t y of the above findings, our focus in Hong 
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Kong will be reflected by the participation mode in the MTR. 
THE STAGE OF INITIATION AND CONSIDERATION 
Returning to the stages of initiation and consideration 
of the MTR, it is officially reported that the Hong Kong ； 、 
government assigned the "expert" of Freeman Fox, Wilbur Smith 
r, 
and Associates from London^ in the 1965 to look at ways to 
« A 
ease the chaotic traffic congestion.。 In a two year study, 
the consulting company proposed the underground subway in 
1967. On the surface, it appears that the decision was based 
on a simple corporatist model, in which the policy was 
’ initiated by 七 h e appointed technocrats of Freeman Fox, Wilbur 
Smith and Associates, and further considered by the Hong Kong 
government. In fact, the government has participated all the 
/ 
way in the decisional stages of 七 h e MTR, recalling that the 
. suggestion of s u b w a y development originated from the transport 
study initiated by the government. It was the government's 
decision to appropriate the fund for the study as well as to 
appoint Freeman Fox Wilbur Smith and Associates. Freeman was 
officially limited to Its consulting role in the transport 
study;七he subsequent issues as later set forth in the MTRC 
Ordinance were brought up i n t e r n a l l y by the Hong Kong 
governmeri七，Nevertheless， the upper-class domination of the 
government has suggested strong elitist input in 七 h e decision-
making of the MTR. 
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Within the structure of the Hong Kong government, the 
Executive and Legislative Councils (or Execo and Legco) are 
the major decision-making bodies. Before 1991， the assignment 
of councillors was generally based on an appointment system.“ 
The members of the two councils were and still are made up of 
official high-ranked bureaucrats, together with what is 
generally reg.arded as the non-official political-technocratic 
i 1} 
elite . 
It was on the 28th February 1975 that the, Mass Transit 
13 ‘ 
.Railway Corporation Bill was published. The composition of 
Execo and Legco back in that particular year, was of a male-
dominant body. B a s i c a l l y , the unofficial members share similar 
background: They received a considerable level of Western 




' Then, they turned to business, fields of 
various kinds. Those who have succeeded in presiding over the 
leading corpora七ions in 七 he colony would be regarded as 
technocratic and business elites by society. They were titled 
with 七 h e royal honour of Justice of Peace (JP) before being 
appointed to Execo and Legco. With their economic power, the 
business elites became the centrepiece of the upper class, and 
later involved themselves in politics. 
During their tenures in Execo and Legco, the unofficial 
members could simultaneously maintain their business offices. 
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A c c o r d i n g l y , the roles of technocratic， business and political 
elites are usual ly played by the same group of p e o p l e . The 
p h e n o m e n o n is not an u n i q u e situation in Hong K o n g , but that 
is of a general political environment in w h i c h public policies 
are f o r m u l a t e d . The o b s e r v a t i o n has long been made by the 
w r i t e r s in political s c i e n c e : 
In the modern s t a t e , the position of elites is 
r e l a t e d to the development of large-scale 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s in m a n y areas of life, with the 
result that there are different kinds of e l i t e s , 
not just those h o l d i n g formal political power...* 
D e f i n e d in this w a y , the political elite is 
composed of bureaucrat ic, m i l i t a r y , aristocratic 
and business e l i t e s , while the political class is 
composed of the political elite together w i t h 
elites from other areas of social life. 
T h e appointment of civil servants has blurred the roles 
of b u r e a u c r a t s and political e l i t e s . It is generally believed 
that in the case of H o n g Kong bureaucrats as civil servants 
are apolitical and simply perform the role of implementator of 
government d e c i s i o n s . H o w e v e r , the ex-officio members of the 
E x e c o and Legco include the Chief Secretary’，the Commander 
B r i t i s h F o r c e s , the Financial Secretary and the A t t o r n e y 
General.
1 6
 M o r e o v e r , a double m e m b e r s h i p of the Executive and 
L e g i s l a t i v e Councillors w a s permitted and was prevalent in the 
Hong K o n g political s y s t e m . T h e double identities and 
o v e r l a p p i n g roles of b u r e a u c r a t s , p o l i t i c a l - t e c h n o c r a t i c 
elites， and the upper class of business elites has depicted a 
p e r p l e x i n g picture of the Hong Kong political r e a l i t y . The 
i m p a r t i a l i t y of the government also became questionable w h e n 
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the decision二making bodies of Legco and Execo were dominated 
by the upper classes. Since it has been identified that the 
government' s policy participation has gone all the way in the 
subway decision, the elitist input was and remains continuous 
and significant in the MTR. 
THE STAGE OF IMPLEMENTATION : 
In view of the large investment on subway development, 
七 h e government's need of financial support and cooperation 
with private organizations was inevitable. Corporatis七 input 
was necessary at the decisional stage of the MTR, when 七 h e 
government had to appeal to private corpora七ions to tender for 
1 n • 
the development. Accordingly, the feasibility of the 
decision was determined by successful negotiations between the 
• 
government and the private organizations of banking and 
, . . - - - - ” I p 
financial institutions, and other developers.
i U
 In addition to 
the elitist feature of the Hong Kong government as just 
mentioned, the collaboration of the public authority with 
private organizations has illustrated 七 h e elitist-corporatist 
model of 七 h e MTR at its decisional stages of initiation and 
cons iderat ion• 
The third decisional stage of implementation in the MTR 
can be further s u b - d i v i d e d into the constructive and operative 
phases. At the phase of c o n s七 r u c t i o n , the corporatist feature 
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was the most salient as the government's cooperation with 
private organizations was important for a successful MTR 
development. Once the subway construction was carried out as 
a "contract—out" arrangement， the business cooperation of 
government with private sectors had begun. Promineri 七 
organizations of locally and overseas in the construction 
field were invited, such as l o c a l constructor of the Hutchison 
Whampao Company,
1 9
 and the international joint corporation of 
GMT which is Gammon(Hong Kong) Limited, K i e r International 
Limited of England, and Lilley Construction Limited of 
Scotland.^ 
Besides the subway construction, 七 h e real estate, 
development above the subway depots also depended on the 
successful business alliance of the MTRC with private 
developers. The i m p o r t a n 七 complexes include： Telford Gardens 
on 七 he Kowloon Bay depot which is a. join 七 development of the 
MTRC with Telford Development Company； Worldwide House in 
Central； and 七 h e Admiralty Centre at Admiralty in another 
cooperation with the Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd/
1
 Luk Yeung 
Sun Tsuen at Tsuen Wan is one of 七 h e biggest joint ventures of 
the MTRC with Sun Company, Hong Kong Land and Jardin. 
The banking industry was another sec七or which had 
actively participated in the MTR development, through 
financial facilitation for the subway project. By the 1990s, 
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there had been over 90 banks and financial i n s t i t u t i o n s 
22 
involved w o r l d w i d e d e l i v e r i n g their services to the M T R C . 
As a c o n s e q u e n c e , the strong a l l i a n c e of the government w i t h 
other private o r g a n i z a t i o n s of related functional sectors 
s u g g e s t s the t o p o l o g y of c o r p o r a t i s m at the c o n s t r u c t i v e stage 
of the M T R . 
U p to this p o i n t , one w o u l d realize that pluralist input 
is n e a r l y u n n o t i c e d in the M T R . N e v e r t h e l e s s , there are some 
good reasons for minimal pluralist input. First of a l l , the 
goal mix of government (please refer to Chapter 4) could be 
too c o m p l e x , f a r - r e a c h i n g and politipal for public 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . If pluralist influence is a l l o w e d , g o v e r n m e n t ' s 
e x p e c t a t i o n s may even be c o n f u s e d . As suggested by L o w i , 
“interest-group liberalism as p u b l i c p h i l o s o p h y . . . d e r a n g e s and 
confuses e x p e c t a t i o n s about d e m o c r a t i c institutions." 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , g o v e r n m e n t g o a l m i x and its achievement could 
also be f r u s t r a t e d . S e c o n d l y , some policies: require an 
immediate d e c i s i o n , such as the sudden w i t h d r a w a l of the 
J a p a n e s e c o n s o r t i u m in 1975. The MTR d e v e l o p m e n t could not 
a f f o r d to w a i t for the c o m p r o m i s e s of interest groups 
s u g g e s t e d by the pluralist d e m o c r a c y . T h i r d l y , the MTR 
d e v e l o p m e n t is carried out in special c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h other 
g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c i e s , such as urban p l a n n i n g . R e f e r r i n g to Lowi 
again， 
liberalism promotes p o p u l a r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g but 
d e r o g a t e s from the d e c i s i o n so made by m i s a p p l y i n g 
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the not ion to the impj-ementat ion as well as the 
formulation of policy,
1 
Hence, popular input may not be compatible with the 
coordination, as well as the integrity and continuity of 
government plan. More s e r i o u s l y , William L. Morrow has 
concluded that "public interest rhetoric can be a some screen 
that hides a. self — interes七一oriented government. "
u 
Accordingly, the group interest is obtained, however, could be 
at the expense of the whole society. 
To support the final argument specifically,工 would -like 
to refer to four kinds of political modes: they are client 
politics, entrepreneurial politics, interest-group politics 
? n 
and finally majoritarian politics. Briefly speaking, client 
politics is a policy with the costs burdening a large 
population, but the beneficiary is only a small amount of 
• 
people. The opposite of client politics is entrepreneurial 
politics, where the cost is imposed on a small number of 
people but the benefit can be enjoyed by the majority of the 
population. I n t e r e s t - g r o u p politics involves both high per 
capita cost and benefit, contrasting the low per capita cost 
and benefit of majoritarian politics. 
In the MTR c o n s t r u c t i o n , the major cost-bearers would, on 
the one hand, be the adjacent t e n a n t s - l a n d o w n e r s in relation 
to land appropriation and pollution. On the other hand, the 
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MTR construction has benefited the majority of Hong Kong 
people. The beneficiaries include both s u b w a y passengers and 
non-passengers. For non-subway riders, the subway depots 
provide free underground passageways(corridors) and more 
frequently areas for the public to wait for friends and 
relatives. The shops and machines which are located in the 
stations provide a variety of services including public 
telephone, banking, newspaper, bakery, shoe repairing and key 
duplication, groceries, and even instant photo-taking. 
Therefore, the large variety of services always attract the 
visits of many non-passengers to the stations. In conclusion, 
the MTR construction is an output of entrepreneurial politics. 
If pluralist inputs were uncontrolled in the first place, 
the MTR development could not have proceeded smoothly and 
speedily. Also, Hong' Kong .people may never enjoy the .said 
benefits when the self-interest of the tenants and landowners 
had dominated the decision. Consequently, the pluralist 
democracy could only result in client politics. The public 
interest of society would be buried in oblivion. Since the 
constructive phase is 七 h e most critical period, it is 
understandable that pluralist power should be kept in check in 
that particular time. 
To control pluralist participation, it is first n e c e s s a r y 
to isolate the decisions from politics. For example, in the 
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most controversial task of land appropriation, the government 
has easily passed the duty to the non-governmental MTRC. By 
creating the Mass Transit Railway (Land Resumption and Related 
Provisions),七he corporation is delegated with the m a n d a t o r y 
power of government to resume land for the use of 
corrstruction. In fact, the MTR Ordinance has similar authority 
to the Crown Lands R e s u m p七 i o n Ordinance， the Land Acquisition 
Ordinance and the Roads Ordinance of o t h e r . governmental 
departments :
L 
After the most critical time of MTR construction, the 
MTRC tried to enhance more popular inputs once the corpora七ion 
began to operate in the marke七• More importantly, the 
corporation had to remedy its already tarnished public image 
during the constructive phase. Therefore, , pluralist 
participation is n o t c o m p l e t e l y subjugated, but is preferred 
to proceed in a mild and gradual manner. 
The pluralist feature could be most clearly seen in 1991， 
when the public protested against the MTR fare increase 
proposal. The political party of the United Democrats 
collected sixteen thousand signatures about the MTRC^. Lau 
Chin Shek, one of the party leaders, even put the public 
objection in more a radical manner, such as threatening to lay 
on the r a i l - t r a c k . The incident was so close to the first 
direct Legco election that the genuine motive of Lau and his 
’113 
party w a s skeptical.
2 9
 N o n e t h e l e s s , the MTRC gave w a y to the 
public over the particular dispute. It was a rare case in the 
MTR' s history that the Board decided to back、down to the 
public pressure.
3 0
 More importantly, the incident has 
dem o n s t r a t e d that pluralist input is likely to be val u e d . The 
MTRC has also activated its col lection of pub lie opinions, 
through its regular public relation programs including the 
location of opinion boxes at the s tat ions, and the annual tea-
‘gathering with passengers.
3 1
 D i s r e g a r d i n g that the MTRC's 
genuine motive could simply be business oriented, the 
increasing channels for popular input could well foster 
p l u r a l i s m in the subway o p e r a t i o n . f 
Des p i t e the allowance for pluralist inputs, the ultimate 
decisional power remains with the M T R C . Since the 1991 direct 、 
Legco election， the public generally believe that they can 
influence government policies through elected m e m b e r s . More 
public voices are actually being transmitted to the 
g o v e r n m e n t . H o w e v e r , the non-governmental nature can always 
isolate the corporat ion from the political forum. 
The isolation could be reflected by the latest fare 
a d j u s t m e n t . The public representatives in government protested 
against the latest fare raise of the KCRC. Early in A p r i l , 
similar actions were taken against the MTRC by the Liberal and 
Uni t e d Democratic legislators.
3 2
 Since the MTRC does not 
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require government approval for fare adjustment, the 
corporation has retained its decision“regardless of the 
criticism. The case suggests that public participation in the 
MTRC remains too indirect through elected members. Also, 
passenger opinion is playing only a marginal role in 七 h e 
MTRG，s policy-making. Despite frequent demands for public 
supervision over the corporation,'^'' the government remains 
committed to the independent set-up of the MTRC • As it is 
through 七 h e n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l MTRC, the government can insulate 
decisions from political forum and public influence. More 
crucially, the insula 七 ion provides the govermneri 七 with a 
leeway to realize its goal-mix. Since the competition of 
interest groups as suggested in pluralism is limited, the MTRC 
remains quite a distance from a mature pluralist model. 
Instead， it is 七 h e c o r p o r a t i s t - e l i t i s t inputs which are now 
dominating the MTR. _ 
Heading to the operative phase, the MTR remains an 
e l i t i s t - c o r p o r a t i s t hybrid with a limited amount of pluralist 
element. Since the MTRC requires new capital, banking 
facilitation remains as important. Also , new constructions are 
still to come after the MTR has begun its operation. As a 
consequence, corporatism happens to go on as long as the 
function of the private sector continues. On the other hand, 
the MTRC Board of Directors is appointed by the government, as 
七 h e public authority is 七 h e sole owner of the corporation. 
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B a s e d on the author's finding, the MTRC is presided over by 
the topotype of elites and bureaucrats similar to the group in 
Execo and Legco; the ex-officio Board members include 
Secretary for P l a n n i n g , Environment and Lands, and Secretary 
for Transport of the government, together with other members 
of Execo and L e g c o . Since the directorship is not supposed to 
carry out actual functions in the corporation, there is a 
suggestion that the appointment to the MTRC is simply a honour 
granted by the Hong Kong government to encourage further 
political and social contribution of the elites to the colony, 
and to boost their loyalty to the government. N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
the MTRC Board of Directors has symbolized the identical 
elitist input of the Hong Kong g o v e r n m e n t . In conjunction with 
the continuous policy participation of other private 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the operative phase of the MTR is remarked by 
a corporatist-elitist combination. 
HONG KONG AND LONDON COMPARED 
In many aspects, the colony has been deeply influenced by 
the British for a very long time. However，— the political 
cultures of Hong Kong and London do not seem a l i k e . By taking 
the MTR as a example, the Hong Kong political system is 
remarked by corporatist e l i t i s m . From the city development of 
L o n d o n , Savitch has identified that the U.K. belongs to a 
36 
liberal corporatist system. 
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Under liberal corporatism, interest groups are much more 
powerful in the Great Britain. Also, under the multiple tier 
system of the U.K. government, the power structure is more 
widespread compared to Hong Kong. Consequently, the power of 
technocrats and elitist in London is weakened. At the 
initiative stage of policy-making, London is still similar to 
Hong Kong: Politicians and technocrats take the initiation, 
with the minimal participation ''of interest groups. 
Nevertheless, the situa七ion is differentiable. In the MTR, the 
public is out of reluctance being restricted from policy 
participation. According to Savi七ch， the n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n in 
London is simply due to the unawareness of interest groups•… 
The largest divergency comes at the stage of policy 
consideration. In London, interest groups would join 
themselves with 七 h e poli七ical power on the multiple tiers, in 
v / 
order to influence the consideration of policy. Therefore, 
conflicts are usual and decision outcomes become uncertain. 
The situation is in contrast to the coherence and integrity as 
found in the MTR. However, at the final stage of 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , both the systems would appear similar as they 




The policy participation m o d e in the MTR is found to be 
an el it ist-corporat ist m o d e l . On the one hand, pluralist 
participation is m i n i m a l , as shown in the case where costs 
have been mandator i ly imposed on landowners and tenants by the 
gov e r n m e n t . On the other hand, the successful MTR development 
has w i d e l y benefited the majority of the population in Hong 
K o n g . M o r e o v e r , the centralized decisional power enables the 
government to control the continuity of the subway development 
and its xiobrdinat ion with other public p o l i c i e s . More 
importantly, as only be carried out through the non-
governmental and independent status of the,MTRC, government 
decisions can be implemented free from public interference. 
Particularly during the most critical stages of initiation and 
consideration, the control of pluralist inputs is salient. 
To achieve better coordination of the MTR dev e l o p m e n t , 
elitism and corporatism have dominated decisions. Corporatism 
becomes necessary when the project relies heavily on the 
support of private o r g a n i z a t i o n s , such as construction and 
banking industries. After the most critical period of 
construction, a gradual expansion of pluralist participation 
is allowed. Nonetheless, the policy participation is generally 
limited so as to ensure the M T R C can perform its duty with 
continuity. Accordingly, the balance between pluralist 
participation and the integrity of a decision is always the 
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most difficult political decision for government. In the 
present case of the MTR, the author believes that the 
successful development of the subway is attributable to the 
correct decision of the government to control pluralist power 
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THE SUBWAY SYSTEMS： HONG KONG AND SINGAPORE COMPARED 
The similar stories of Hong Kong and Singapore have 
attracted many comparative studies on the two areas. Being 




Hong Kong and Singapore have created the same economic miracle 
of turning the "barren rocks" into pearl cities.！Moreover,七he 
two areas are facing a similar demographic situation of 
accommodating a large population with scare lands. To uphold 
the "metropolitan" image, a good transportation network is 
necessary. Therefore, it is worthy to compare the modern 
transportation mode of the two city-states, such as the 
subways. 
As mentioned in C h a p t e r 1， the construction ^nd
 :
i 
opera•七ion of the MRT in Singapore are separately tasked by the 
MRTC and the SMRT. Besides the external factors of population 
s i z e
, demographic situation and the location of subway 
stations, the performance of a subway system, also relates to 
the organization in charge. Hence, it is also required ta 
compare the performance of the MTRC with the MRTC and the 
SMRT. Again, it is reinstated that the main theme of this 
thesis is to substantiate that 七he MTRC could successfully 
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fulfil government policies, namely, of providing the economic 
efficient and socially effective underground mass transport 
services in a high-dense area, such as Hong Kong (Chapter 1). 
Choosing the Singaporean case
 5
 the author can concurrently 
compare the MTRC with both the public organization of the MRTC 
and the private company of the SMRT in Singapore, 
In Chapter 1, both the ridership and the financial 
results of the MTRC and the MRTC have been compared. In fact, 
• the MRT is modelled after the MTR.
1
 Hence, I will attribute 
the discrepancies also to the different pol i'tical-economic 
systems of the 七 w o city-states. In view of 七 h e s u b w a y 
construction, the author has regarded Hong Kong as a semi — 
capi七alis七 system and will refer Singapore to a planned and 
welfare one. More importantly, this chapter will try to 
suggest that 七 he operation of the former could be more 
preferred to the latter, in terms of economic efficiency and . 
social effectiveness of train service delivery. 
Chapter 2 has identified that the MTRC reflects the 
c o l o n y as semi — c a p i t a l i s m • Then what is a "welfare state"? 
Contrasting capitalism, 
welfare state， while having no detailed content, is 
the general idea that misfortunes that have 
financial consequences to those unable to manage 
should all be
n
 dealt with by the state, through its 
taxing p o w e r , 
Then, why is 七 he MRT ( S ingapore ) referred to as a welfare 
125 
sys tem? 
As m e n t i o n e d in Chap t e r 1， the MRT(Singapore) 
co n s t r u c t ion is deemed a pub lie infrastructure paid for by the 
g o v e r n m e n t , unlike its Hong K o n g counterpart w h i c h is 
committed to the construct ion cost . In Singapore, neither the 
M R T C nor the SMRT has the burden of the building expenses for 
the Si n g a p o r e a n s u b w a y . T he financial burden of the MRT 
con s t r u c t i o n w as imposed on the so c i e t y (the tax-payers) of 
Singapo-re-; this has depicted its public and we l f a r e features 
from the very b e g i n n i n g . 
In view of fare setting, the train fare of the 
MRT(Singapore) is, howe v e r , s l i g h t l y higher than that of Hong 
K o n g . T a k i n g the 1991 price level , the train fare of the 
M T R ( H o n g Kong) w a s HK$4.19 per passenger,
3
 compared with 
s
$ 0 . 9 1 (around H K $ 4 . 2 ) per pas s e n g e r charge of the 
MRT(Singapore). Since the price index of H o n g K o n g was higher 
than that of Singapore, the transporting cost of the M R T in 
Singapore became more expensive c o m p a r e d to the MTR in Hong 
K o n g . 
D e s p i t e the similar level of train fares， the p r i v a t e 
company is. actually obliged to prov i d e the train services at 
"affordable fares".
4
 H o w e v e r , s i n c e the MRT operation has been 
licensed to a private company, its operating cost needs to be 
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shared by train-users• Nevertheless， the paternalistic nature 
of the subway construction in Singapore remains strong. There 
are other facilities not enjoyed by Hong Kong people from the 
MTR(Hong Kong), such as the military defence construction of 
the Singaporean MRT design. Nine of 七 h e MRT's(Singapore) 
underground depots are equipped with emergency facilities, 
including 七 h e supply " of electricity, air-control and 
bathrooms.
5
 The particular structures are specially construed 
to shelter bomb attacks in the cases of war, and are also 
standardized by the National Defence Department.More analyses 
in this regard will be made later in this chapter. First of 
all, a review of the MRT background can provide us with more 
insights for our discussion. 
THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE SINGAPOREAN SUBWAY SYSTEM ‘ 
• Considering the geographic•similari七ies， both Hong "Kong 




 for Hong Kong and an even smaller area of 620km" for 
Singapore, to accommodate relatively large populations. 
Despite c o m p a r a t i v e l y more land for Hong Kong, 80% of it is 
mountainous/ which has hindered the city，s development• 
In regard to 七 h e population size of Singapore, it has 
long been around half of that of Hong Kong . In 1988，Hong Kong 
had 5.7 million people, compared with 七 h e population of only 
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n 
2.7 millions in Singapore. In fact, the sources of the 
demographic changes of the two cities are considerably 
different: The population growth in Hong Kong is significantly 
attributed t o migration since t h e late 1930s, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
refugees from the mainland China.' The large population 
resulted in high mobility on the relatively scarce land of 
Hong Kong, ever since the 1960s. The suggestion for an 
underground railway firs七 surfaced in 1967 as a way to solve 
the traffic nightmare in the city. 
In the case of Singapore, migration could dominate the 
popula 七 ion growth only up to 1947, when the government 
effected immigration controls.
9
 Therefore, it is a significant 
contrast to Hong Kong that in Singapore, immigration played a 
less important role； rather，七he natural increase dominated 
the demographic changes of the cit
y
_s七ate. The idea of MRT 
originated in the State and City Planning of 1967; and it was 
in the 1970s the suggestion was made. Recalling the- lower 
population density of the Singapore" which could provide more 
manageable road conditions, this explains the later need for 
a subway network in the country. 
The major function of underground r'ailways is to resolve 
the problem of traffic conges七ions on ground surfaces. 
Inefficient and excessive usage of private cars always lead to 
the problem of traffic jam. In Singapore, people have long 
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relied on private car carriage‘ Between 1962-73, the average 
growth of private vehicles was 8.8% per annum.
iU
 There were 
、v 
27. 3% of car-owning household in 1972 .
11
 In the following 
year, the number of private cars was over half of the total 
vehicles of the country. Foreseeing the potential risk of 
七 r a f f i c congestion, the Singaporean government imposed 七 he 
Area Licens 
ing Scheme(ALS) in 1 9 7 5广 a n d levied heavy taxes 
of different kinds on car o w n e r s h i p . I n spite of all 七 he 
stringent policies imposed by officials, the ridership of 
private cars remained high at 48% in 1975 ,
i5
 and has stayed 
at 42% since 1983.
15
 The situation suggests the stubbornly 
unchanged preference of Singaporeans for private transport. 
Nevertheless, traffic flow would remain smooth as 40-50km per 
hour.
1 7
 The situation can more or less be attributed to the 
successful programme of car pooling. In 1975, 40% of private 
• 
vehicles in r e s t r i c t e d areas wer..e car pooled, 52% in 1980，and 
• 4 7 % in 1983.
13
 Hence, in view of . the ra七her smooth road 
movement in Singapore,七he construction of subways was not as 
imminent as in Hong Kong. 
In 七 h e city of Hong Kong, people are used to depend on 
public transports of various kinds, such as public buses, 
trains, vans and ferries. Private vehicles occupied only 6.9% 
o f 七 h e t o t a l r i d e r s h i p i n 1966, 12.6% i n 1 9 7 4 , ^ a n d 11.18% 
in 1984 .
20
 In 1984 , the rate of car-owning households was 
17%.
21
 The disproportion of the private car ownership with its 
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actual ridership has suggested that many car owners still make 
more uses of public transport for their daily carriage. The 
phenomena also indicates that the full usage of public 
transport in Hong Kong still could not resolve the traffic 
nightmares, this has justified the necessity of a new 
transport mode of subways. Besides, it is discovered, 
of all the cities in the world of Singapore's size 
or larger, and with the same level economic 
-development as expressed by Gross Domestic Product 
per head, only three do not have a high capacity-
public transport system, while many smaller cities 
in developed countries have such systems. 
Other than the transport policy and urban planning of the 
Singaporean government in particular, the author speculates 
that the purpose of enhancing the metropolitan image and 
status of Singapore gave momentum to the decision—making• 
The environmental concern of the officials could be 
another impetus, in view of the s p e c i a l enthusiasm the 
Singaporean government contributed. The environmental 
safeguards include the establishment of air quality monitoring 
stations, regulations for auto inspections and repairs, and 
the leviation of a severe tax upon old vehicles• It is known 
23 
that underground railways are lowest atmospheric polluters 
a n
d better fuel savers
24
 than other forms of transports. 
The seriousness of Hong Kong,s traffic problem has made 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the MTR a topmost priority. With 
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comparison， the MRT in Singapore appears to p lay less a 
relieving role but has more of a fall back function in the 
still control 1 able traffic conditions of the area. Therefore, 
it appears that the dec is ion-making of the MRT could be 
motivated more by its marginal benefits than the public 
necessity for the costly construction. The background has 
illustrated the lower ridership of the MRT in Singapore, 
compared to its Hong Kong counterpart. 
THE OPERATION OF MTR。VF.RSIJS MRTC AND SMRT 
For the different orientat ions of the two governments, 
the constructions of the MTR and the MRT are respectively of 
the commercial and welfare natures. Also, the operational 
goals of the two public organizations differ. The MTRC(Hong 
Kong) is based on the "prudent commercial principle." The 
corporation is further motivated by the government's 
enthusiasm for profit-making. In contrast, the MRTC(Singapore) 
strives to uphold its s o c i a l principle of providing the public 
"the high level of service with an affordable fare 
structure."
2 5
 Due to the lack of business focus on the MRTC, 
the Singaporean government has to subsidize the public 
corporation. The profit-oriented MTRC(Hong Kong) and the 
government subsidized MRTC(Singapore) contrast the semi-
capitalist Hong Kong and the welfare state in Singapore. 
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In order to uphold its welfare nature, the 
MRTC( Singapore) needs to sacrifice economic efficiency. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the MRTC(Singapore) suffered from a 
S$159,473，000 loss in 1989/90. It still remained with a 
SS200,000 deficit after a generous grant was received from the 
g o v e r n m e n t T h e organizational budget even deteriorated in 
1990/91, wher^ the def icit was S$269 , 517,000 (around 
HK$1266.72 million).
2 7
 Again, it was governmen七 subsidies to 
break even 七 h e MRTC's(Singapore) accoun七• Since profitability 
i s n o t t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s e x p e c t a t i o n , 七 h e f i n a n c i a l l o s s 
suffered may not cause too big a disappointment to 七 he 
Singaporean government. However, if the deficit continues, it 
will constitute a long term financial burden to society, such 
as tax-payers (for details, see Diagram 6 and Table 1). 
• • 
工七 seems that a public organization may no七devote much 
> effort to maximize its performance . when there is a lack of 
sufficient pressures/ In strong opposition to the welfare 
system, Milton has made a critical comment: 
the waste is distressing but it is the least of the 
evils of the pateirnalis七ic programs that have grown 
to such massive size. Their major evil is their 
ef fee 七 on the fabric of our society. They weaken 
七 h e family； reduce 七 h e incentive to work, save and 
innovation； reduce^the accumulation of capital and 
limit our freedom" 
In lacking budgetary obiigations， these concerns suggested for 
七 h e MRTC are not without grounds. 
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Diagram 6 Comparison of budgetary conditions 
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Table 1 Financial statistics of the year 1991 (in HK$Million) 
MTRC ‘ MRTC SMRT 
•IT O T A L 
•REVENUE 
f-Train fares 3，041 —— 864.33 
• -Others 512 6.74木 172.49 
15.19** 
• O P E R A T I N G 1 ,473 147.23 530.16 
K COSTS “ 
I DEPRECIATION 561 570.89 
1. INTEREST AND 
|| F I N A N C I A L 
1 CHARGES 1,454 570.54 
I O P E R A T I N G ….... 
I PROFIT 65 
• PROFIT ON 
I P R O P E R T Y 2 
DEVELOPMENT 




I YaX —— ― 一 46/. 6o 
疆.•• . y 
The currency ra七e in 1991 was S$1,00 to HK$4.70. 
* Operating revenue 
I *氺 Non-operating revenue 
Source: MTRC Annual Report 1991 
MRTC Annual Report 1991 
SMRT Annual Report 1991 
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As mentioned in Chapter .1 , the MTRC in Hong Kong in fact 
enjoys a better financial state than the private operator of 
the SMRT‘ In view of the total revenue of 19 91, the MTRC has 
generated HKS3,553 million,
29
 In the same year, the SMRT has 
earned SS220 . 6 mill ion
30
 ( around HK$ 1 , 036 ..82 million ) , which 
is less than a third of the MTRC' s revenue. However, the MTRC 
has to service the hefty construction costs. Therefore, 
interest and financial charges always place the corporation 
(the MTRC) in a less favourable financial condition. After the * . . . . 
payment for interest and financial charge of HK$
;
1 ,454 in 1991， 
'i]- . . 
the MTRC had only HK$67 million profit/*. Under a much easier 
financial s i t u a 七 i o n ， 七 he S$107•8 million (around HK$506.66 
million) profit generated by the SMRT could not reflect a 
better financial achievement by the corporation. 
• 
Ridership scncT quality of service 
In terms of ridership, the MTRC(Hong Kong) is also 
gaining 七 h e upper h a n d . After five years allowing the 
MRT(Singapore) to penetrate into the market, the Singaporean 
subway gained a total number of 202,280,OOO
3 2
 passengers in 
1991 which was a 3.8% increase''
5
 on the pervious year; 
however, the figure was in fact less than one third of 七 he 
“ ^ t 
MTR(Hong K o n g ) ' s patronage of 725,966,000 , The weekday 
average of p a s s e n g e r s in that vear was 617,500 for the 
MRT(Singapore), significantly less than 七 h e MTR's(Hong Kong) 
figure of 2,156,000 (Diagrams 7 and 8). Why is there a heavier 
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Diagram 7 Comparison of ridership of the MTR and MRT (total 
weekday passengers) • 
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ridership of the MTR(Hong Kong)? And why has the MTRC(Hong 
Kong) achieved better financial results? 
A comparison of the ridership of the two subways may be 
unfair to the new comer, the MRT(Singapore) . The presen七 six 
year old MRT(Singapore) can hardly compete with the already 
thirteen year history of the MTR(Hong Kong). More importantly， 
七 h e MTR is the busies七 subway in the world,"
1
' and is also one 
A g 
of the few metros to run on a prof i七•…
0
 For the train 
operation, the corporation has made the railway operating 
profit of HK$23 . 96 per car km, or HKS2.52 per passenger 
ft n 
carried in 七 h e year of 1991/ Hence
 5
 one of the factors for 
the business successes could be the better experience of the 
MTRC(Hong Kong). Besides,.七he MRT background has highlighted 
七 h e factor of public necessity for a subway network. Also, 
• 
quality of services could be a determinant factor. 
As part of its statutory obligation, the Hong Kong MTRC-
was designed to survive in the market. In order to compete and 
survive in the public transport m a r k e t ,七 he MTRC has to 
provide good quality of its train services. With regard to the 
convenience of train services, the MTR of Hong Kong runs 671 
rail cars at an interval of 2-2.25 minutes at peak hours and 
of 3—5 minu七es at non-peak ones, for 19 operating hours every 
day.
3 8
 Public complaints against the MTR have always been 
<5 r 
maintained at a very low figure of around 50 cases annually," 
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despite its huge volume of ridership. The 1991/92 statistics 
have even suggested a drastic drop in complaints by 55% 
compared with 1990/91. Out of the total number of 21 cases in 
1991/92, only 3 complaints were m a d e agains七七he adequacy of 
service. The other 15 and 3 cases were respectively related to 
1
 .40 
standard of service and general. 
Relatively speaking, the services of the MRT in Singapore 
are less frequent. There are only 396 rail cars, at a 
frequency of 3.5-4 and 6-8 minutes respectively at peak and 
non-peak intervals, also servicing 19 hours per day. In spite 
of the speedy carriage of the subway, the not-that-frequent 
schedule of the MRT could discourage the public. In contrast, 
the more frequent train services of the MTR in Hong Kong which 
delivers a higher mobility of transport, has created a better 
• 
attraction for passengers. 
Besides frequency and punctuality, the safe level of 
subway services provides another criterion for quality 
evaluation. It has been shown that the more frequent train 
services and higher number of car-trains allows— the Hong Kong 
MTR to provide a better service than its— Singaporean 
c o u n t e r p a r t . T h e s a f e level of t h e M T R C of Hong Kong h a s 
improved from 1. 58 accidents per million passengers in 1982 to 
1.11 in 1991. Even 七 h o u g h accidents have increased in actual 
number from 5 5 3 to 8 0 8 ,
4 1
 the situation can be explained by 
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the relative increase of patronage. However, it is 
disappointing that the statistics of the MRT(Singapore) in 
this regard have not been revealed for use in our current 
comparison. 
From a different viewpoint, the less frequent 
MRT(Singapore) is attributed 七 o 七 h e lower demand for its 
services. To arrive at market equilibrium, supply has to meet 
with demand. Otherwise, the company has to suffer losses from 
the hefty operational costs. Obviously, the private company of 
七 h e SMRT could not tolerate a long term deficit. In .view of 
the MTR(Hong Kong),七he Hong Kong subway has also demonstrated 
that government intervention can enhance the demand. 
• 
Public and Private management: A proper balance 
With government ownership, the government is more willing 
and able to benefit the corporation through public policies, 
such as the”inter—model coordina七ion"• For example, the Hong 
Kong government has imposed heavy taxes on automobiles since 
1982 so as to eliminate ownership of private cars. Such 
financial measures include significant increases on car 
registration tax, license fee and duties on g a s o l i n e . N o t 
only would the policy bring a sizable income to the Public 
T r e a s u r y , but also the usage o f public transport i s 
encouraged. As a consequence, the control of private cars, in 
’39 
conjunction with the "inter-model coordination", can secure 
the ridership of the MTR(Hong Kong). In addition to the above, 
the autonomy of the MTRC on fare adjustments, as statutorily 
set out in the MTRC(Hong Kong) Ordinance, has therefore 
contributed to the good financial performance of the 
cor^porat ion. 
In Singapore, 七 he government also imposes stringent 
restrictions on private vehicles, such as the Area Licensing 
Scheme(ALS) since 1975. Nevertheless, unlike its Hong Kong 
couri七eppsi]?七 protecting 七 h e MTR in particular, the Singaporean 
government takes more a neutral stand in its transpor七 policy. 
Since 七 he private SMRT has an equal footing with other 
franchised public transport, the corporation cannot expect 
special treatment from 七 h e government. B u s services remain as 
" 43 
the backbone of public transportation in the coun七ry..
1 
Despite the apparently greater fairness of the 
Singaporean government, its indiscriminatory attitude to all 
public transport has disfavoured the MRT's(Singapore) 
business. Therefore, the situation may explain the 
dissatisfactory ridership of the Singaporean subway. Since 
七 rain fares c o n t r i b u t e the major income source, ridership 
would de七ermine the company financial condi七ion. Accordingly, 
the heavy ridership of 七 he Hong Kong subway is one of the 
major factors which explain the better budgetary condition of 
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the MTRC. I would suggest the extent of commercialization is 
another. 
Apparently the MRT has a stronger sense of privatization, 
as the subway has been licensed to a private operator. In 
actual fact, the MRTC is more commercialized than the SMRT. 
The SMRT(Singapore) is granted a 七 e n year renewable license 
for running the subway. Further issues in relation to 七 he 
MRT(Singapore) operations are based on agreement between the 
SMRT and 七 h e MRTC. Even though the MRT operation has been 
privatized to the business sector of the SMRT
 5
 七 h e government 
owned MRTC(Singapore) holds veto in the private company by 
means of its ownership of a Special Rights Preference Share in 
七 he SMRT.
4 4
 A c c o r d i n g l y , the SMRT activities are subject to 
the government's ultimate control, under the operating license 
coupled with the just mentioned special share of the company, 
• for example, fare setting. To uphold the "welfare" nature of 
the MRT(Singapore), the SMRT is missioned to set at the fare 
a t
 the "socially affordable" level as mentioned. In 七 h i s 
r e
g a r d , the c o r p o r a t i o n is likely to follow government^ 
direction, which is unlike the n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l MTRC which has 
full autonomy in this area. Besides the financial matter， the 
SMRT i s c i r c u m s c r i b e d by. the government in many areas, such as 
its business activities. 
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T h e strategy of Hong Kong M T R C to achieve p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
i n v o l v e s its va r i o u s business a c t i v i t i e s . Besides train f a r e , 
it is worth noting that the revenues of the MTRC(Hong Kong) 
are generated from different s o u r c e s , particularly from real 
e s t a t e . There are rentals, building management and 
a d v e r t i s i n g . In c o m p a r i s o n , the business activities of the 
SMRT are fettered by the licensing scheme and the pref e r e n c e 
share of the g o v e r n m e n t . As a result, 90% of the 
. 45 
“SMRT's(Singapore) revenue is g e n e r a t e d from train f a r e s . 
Equipped w i t h complete a u t o n o m y to develop commercial and 
residential c o m p l e x e s , the M T R C ( H o n g Kong)has y i e l d e d a big 
w i n d f a l l in the long booming real estate market in H o n g K o n g . 
T h e colony has long suffered from a housing s h o r t a g e , w h i c h 
w i t h the laissez faire policy of the go v e r n m e n t , has pushed 
r e n t a l s to become inaffordably h i g h for the general p u b l i c . As 
re c e n t l y as in 1989， the p u b l i c housing and government 
o w n e r s h i p estates could a c c o m m o d a t e 41.1% and 6% respe c t i v e l y 
of the total population.
4 6
 A c c o r d i n g l y , the ma j o r i t y of Hong 
K o n g people are still subject to the ruthless real estate 
m a r k e t . However, the housing d e v e l o p m e n t s of the MT R C ( H o n g 
K o n g
) are p r i v a t e . M o r e o v e r , m a n y areas have been turned into 
"prime sites" in the colony a l o n g s i d e nearby construction of 
the M T R . As a consequence， the p r o p e r t y market-of the regions 
has boomed even f u r t h e r . 
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At present, the MTRC (Hong Kong) is running .joint ventures 
with private developers and has 19 commercial and residential 
complexes. In 1988， the MTRC(Hong Kong) gained its highest 
income of HKS722 million dollars from its property 
developments.
4 7
 Through the MTRC(Hong Kong), the Hong Kong 
government has become the biggest speculator on the real 
estate market-.of the c o l o n y . Therefore, this phenomenon has 
also well prescribed the semi-capitalist nature of the MTRC， 
which is s t r o n g l y upheld by the government. 
In Singapore, the overall market does no七 allow the kind 
of speculation which occurs in Hong Kong. In place of the 
almost unfettered laissez faire policy of Hong Kong, the 
Singaporean government is running a planned system. In 
Singapore, necessary goods and services are under government 
/ 
control, such as the a l r e a d y mentioned subway services and 七 h e 
now discussed housing market. A remarkable portion of the 
public treasury is arranged for public housing development, 
such as in 1981 , where S$6.7 billion (which is US$3.5 billion) 
was allocated 七o the construction of public houses. After four 
five-year programs in 20 years , 70% of the population had been 
accommodated, and 6 2% of which had acquired the ownerships of 
19 
their public houses in 1981. ‘
J 
Besides subway construction, housing development has 
reflected the welfare nature of Singapore. The demand for 
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residential units in Singapore is not as strong as in Hong 
� 
Kong. The Singaporean government learnt a big lesson from 
property development. In 1982, the Urban Redevelopment , 
A u t h o r i t y m i s c a l c u l a t e d t h e m a r k e t f u t u r e o f c o m m e r c i a l 
properties. Under the wrong government p o l i c y to encourage 
off—ice construct ion by selling more lands, an additional 50% 
of c o m m e r c i a l " .. buildings were constructed. However, the 
cons七ruction coincided with the. global recession in 1982. In 
that year, the overbuilding resulted in a significant drop of 
office rents by 3 0%.
49
 As a consequence, the Singaporean 
government is now rather cautious about allowing similar 
housing developments above subway depots. Hence, the 
activities of the SMRT in the property market has been 
limited. Still there are some undertakings in the real estate 
business by the S M R T ( S i n g a p o r e ) at subway stations,. However, 
its 177 s h o p u n i t reri七als
50
. are almost unnoticeable, compared 
with 七 h e MTRC's (Hong Kong) development of 31,366 residential 
flats, 194,300 sqm office area, 245,700 sqm office area and 
51 
139,400 sqm government institutional and community area.“ 
Also lacking the special windfall in real estate， the 
financial performance of 七 h e SMRT has not been as glamorous. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In terms of the social effectiveness and economic 
efficiency of the MRT(Singapore) , this chapter has suggested 
that the "planned and welfare system" of Singapore may not 
provide a desired mechanism to run public transport services 
in Hong Kong's context. Lacking the market impingement, the 
MRTC's budget is disastrous. However, neither the government 
nor 七he corporation expects profitability in the first place. 
However, the long term deficit will constitute a large 
financial burden to taxpayers. Also, without the special 
safeguards of the government,七he MRT becomes underused. If 
the subway operation had not been privatized to the SMRT, the 
burden could have b e e n weightier. Even though the MRT has been 
privatized, its commercial nature is not as strong as the 
MTR(Hong Kong). Since the "welfare" sense is very strong in 
Singapore, many business activities have been subjugated. 
Therefore, the SMRT also cannot perform in full force in the 
market (see Appendix V). 
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This thesis has conducted a study on the privatized MTRC in 
Hong Kong. Be七ween laissez-faire system and government 
interventionism, to a certain extent can n o n — g o v e r n m e n t a l 
organizations(NGO) satisfy both sides. Taking the! MTRC as an 
example, the NGO as a public organization undertakes the market 
duty for goods and service delivery. Concurrently, the NGO is 
capable of suiting the capitalist system of Hong Kong. 
How does the MTRC suit the capitalist system? It has been 
suggested that the "ccmmercial" nature of the privatized MTRC . 
constitutes a s e m i - c a p i t a l i s t system. Within the system, the market 
nature is still maintained. Compared to the provision of goods and 
services through welfare, the privatized MTRC is more compatible 
with the laissez-faire principle of Hong Kong. 
Furthermore, the distinctive nature of the MTRC in the legal, 
economic and political c o n t e x t s differentiates.the corporation from 
a
 public government bureau. The "private" features could enhance 
the flexibility in the MTRC operation. With this flexibility, the 
organization can skilfully avoid many shortcomings of public 
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bureaus, such as rigidity, monetary waste and others. 
Autonomy entails flexibility. The autonomy of the MTRC enables 
the organization to transform into the most desirable structure in 
accordance with its changing needs and the capricious environment. 
Over the 18 years, the MTRC has gradually transformed from a 
professional bureaucracy to a machine-dominant bureaucracy 
nowadays. Moreover, the flexibility in administration and 
management enables the MTRC to infuse the organic elements of the 
commercial world into its machine model of operation. 
The semi-public and semi-private nature has also equipped the 
MTRC with a variety of decisional strategies. Alongside the 
synoptic model of public policy analysis, it is the incremental . 
strategy of the privatS sector allowing the MTRC to dissolve the 
sudden, u n f o r e s e e a b l e incidents. More crucially, the design of non-
governmental organization can effectively insulate government 
decisions from the political interference and popular pressure. 
Hence, the MTR is found to be a elitist-corporatist mode of policy 
participation, with controlled pluralist inputs. Through the MTRC, 
the government can skilfully depoliticize the most sensitive issues 
into commercial matters. 
Finally, the thesis has challenged the welfare nature of 
public goods and service delivery. Comparing the economic 
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efficiency and social effectiveness of the Hong Kong and 
Singaporean subways, the former has made a better performance. 
Besides the external factors of population and geographic 
differences, the hybrid set-up of the MTRC has contributed to its 
better performance. The corporation can e x t r a c七 the best parts from 
both public and private spheres: As a public organization, the MTRC 
enjoys the institutional backing of government. This special 
treatment provides 七 h e corporation with a leeway in many aspects. 
Concurrently, its "private" nature allows flexibility in operation, 
as any other private business. 
i 
FINDINGS BEYOND THE MTR 
From the MTR, there are further implications the author has 
made. Firstly, the finding of the indivisibility of politics and 
public administration. Secondly, the interminglement of public and 
private realms. 
In regard to the politics and public administration dichotomy, 
Woodrow Wilson has tried to separate the two. According to Wilson, 
"The broad plans of governmental action are not administra七iver tlie 
detailed execution of such plans is administrative...the 
distinction is between general plans and special means."
l
 From a 
similar dimension of generality and speciality^ another German 
w r i t
e r , Biuntshli has made the distinction on the "size" of an 
issue: 
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Politics... is state activity :in things great and 
universal," while "administration, on the other hand," is 
"the activity of the state in individual ayid small 
things, Politics is thus the special province of fhe 
statesman, administration of the technical official. 
However, the MTRC has suggested that the above distinction is 
impractical and even could be untrue. 
It has been identified that the MTR and the MTRC are the 
specific means for the government to achieve its goal-mix. Based on 
the analysis of Wilson and Biuntshli, the government's goal-mix, 
and the MTR and MTRC are respectively referred to 七 h e politics and 
administration. Hence, the boundaries between the two ought to be 
clear-cut. However, the role of government is continuous and 
significant in the MTR and the MTRC. Symbolically, the MTRC Board 
‘i
s S
a t upon by government appointed members. In reality, the 
government has made many important d e c i s i o n s for the corporation, 
including the design of the new MTR extension, and the' financial 
a r r a n g e m e n t s • In addi七ion, lots of political considerations are 
involved in the MTR; for example those which have been discussed in 
the new airport extension. Most of the 七 i m e , the government has 
skilfully shifted the public focus from politics to the commercial 
grounds. Nevertheless, the political issues still remain, albeit 
behind the smoke screen of the privatized MTRC. 
According to the definition of "Politics" in the Century 
Dictionary, it Is "in the narrower and more usual sense,七he act or 
vocation of guiding or influencing the policy of a government 
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through the organization of a party among its citizens..••“Under 
the Hong Kong political system, government policies are usually 
decided closed-door. Therefore, people can take actions only when 
decisions are settled. Accordingly, the time for interest groups to 
exert their influence could be during policy implementation, when 
their interests are concerned. As noted in the MTR, "politics" are 
the mosjt salient at the stage of construction and opera 七 ion. 
Accordingly, "politics" occurs along the line of "administration". 
Therefore, the two elemen七s are co—existeri七 and even overlap with 
each other. The indivisibility has also been perceived by Frank J. 
Goodnow: / 
Practical political necessity makes impossible the 
consideration of 七 h e function of policies apart from that 
of administration. Politics must have a certain control 
over administration, using the
 4
works in 七 h e broad senses 
heretofore attributed to them. 
Accordingly, it could be unrealistic and even meaningless to 
separate politics and administration. In stead, good coordination 
among related o f f i c e s would be the most desired by the society. 
The second issue 七 h i s thesis has touched upon is the public 
and private dichotomy. In the Western context, the public/private 
distinction was advocated in the nineteenth century w h e n the.market 
theory dominated the Western political—economic system. It was 
after the Second World War, society pressed demands for a welfare 
and regulatory government to promote public interest. Since then, 
七 h e role of government had expanded and gradually penetrated into 
5 • … ： 
the private sphere. 
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Returning to the situation in Hong Kong, the riots in the 
1960S hastened the growth of government. The riots were identified 
as the outlet of public discontent with their livelihood. To resume 
political stability, the government had to readjust its political 
orientation from a completely hand off laissez-faire policy to 
"positive non-interventionism. Therefore, the function of 
government was expanded 七〇 supply more public goods and services. 
Nowadays through education, medica七ion， accommodation， social 
welfare, labour, community services and various kinds of 
7 
infrastructure ， a n d general services including law and order, 
government activities have affected almost every aspect of our 
life. 
According to a Chinese saying, the four most imminent elements 







'. In the MTR，the role of 
government has extended to the area of transportation. However, the 
expanse of public sector may no七 be easily noticed by the general 
public, when the public goods and services are facilitated through 
the form of n o n - g o v e r n m e n t set-up. Taking the MTRC as an example, 
t h
e private face has "deformed” 七 h e public nature of 七 h e 
organization. The p u b l i c / p r i v a t e boundaries have been blurred 
fur七her b y 七 h e e m e r g e n c e o f d i f f e r e n t f o r m s o f p r i v a t i z a t i o n , s u c h 
a s
 franchising. On the other hand, some nonprofit "private" 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s would undertake certain government activities for 
benevolent purpose.
3
 Those "private" profit-seeking firms can even 
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be held subject to government regulations and o t h e r guidelines in 
their activities. In contrast to the market theory of Adam Smith, 
七 h e "invisible hand" of "government" is in fact omnipresent even in 
the free market of Hong Kong. Also, the grey region between the 
public and private spheres are so extensive that the p u b l i c / p r i v a t e 
dichotomy could simply be a paradox nowadays. 
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis is designed 七 o . s e r v e as a descriptive function of 
t h e
 MTRC. Due to "the social and economic successes of 七 he 
corporation, the writer has selected the MTRC as a suggested 
framework to other n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations. However, the 
M T R C
 model is not intended to be an omnipotent, normative model to 
serve all situations； for example, the goods and services decided 
to be welfare in nature by s o c i e t y . Also, most of the arguments 
• 
have been made are based on the c a p i t a l i s t values of the laissez-
f a i r e " principle in Hong Kong. Hence, the. analysis may not fulfil 
the scenario of other political - e c o n o m i c systems, such as the 
w e l f a r e s y s t e m o f S i n g a p o r e . At t h e b o t t o m l i n e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e 
MTRC has provided the H o n g K o n g government a good model to deliver 
goods and services of n o n - w e l f a r e nature, such as public transport 
of the mass transit railway. 
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